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PRIORITIZING PAST CARETAKING IN 
CHILD-CUSTODY DECISIONMAKING 
KATHARINE T. BARTLETT* 
I 
INTRODUCTION: THE BEST-INTERESTS DILEMMA AND THE ALI’S PROPOSED 
SOLUTION 
There is much to be said for the best-interests standard for resolving child-
custody conflicts.1 It conveys that the child’s interests are the most important 
consideration in these conflicts—more important than, say, the interests of their 
parents or other interested adults, and more important than other competing 
social goals, such as fairness and equality. It also gives maximum flexibility for 
considering the individual needs and circumstances of the child. 
The problem is that even if everyone can agree that a child’s interests should 
be paramount, they do not agree about what best serves those interests. In the 
absence of more specific criteria to decide custody cases, judges are left to rely 
on their own intuitions about what is best for children, or the intuitions of those 
upon whom they choose to rely. 
Almost forty years ago, in the article celebrated in this issue of Law and 
Contemporary Problems, Robert Mnookin analyzed the difficulties with the 
best-interests standard in terms of the mismatch between what the traditional 
adjudication model provides and what the best-interests standard requires. He 
explained that courts are designed to adjudicate facts about past acts,2 whereas 
the best-interests standard requires courts to evaluate persons and 
relationships, predict future behaviors and the impact of those behaviors upon 
others, and hypothesize the value to the child of each possible outcome.3 These 
determinations, on the one hand, often reflect systematic class and gender 
biases about parenting, education, religion, and morality. On the other hand, 
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 1.  For a history of child-custody standards, including the evolution from a paternal presumption 
to the best-interests standard, see MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S 
RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES (1994). 
 2.  Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of 
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 249–54 (Summer 1975). 
 3.  Id. at 255–61. 
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they can also be highly idiosyncratic. Importantly, differences of opinion are not 
resolvable by scientific evidence; even experts can disagree about which 
available option is “best” for a child, making judicial reliance on child-custody 
evaluations another version of the problem, not a solution to it.4 
Many legislatures have enhanced their custody statutes with specific 
decisionmaking criteria. These criteria encompass every factor potentially 
relevant to a child’s welfare, from each parent’s comparative parenting skills, 
moral fitness, and willingness to cooperate with the other parent, to the age and 
sex of the child, the quality of the relationship each child has with each parent, 
and the child’s adjustment to his home, school, and community. 5 However, 
although these specific factors appear to give greater guidance to courts, most 
of the criteria are themselves open-ended and subjective. In addition, few of the 
statutes prioritize the different factors, which means that a factor given little 
weight by one court may be dispositive for another. 
To achieve greater determinacy, advocates have urged the adoption of 
preferences or presumptions, such as a presumption in favor of the primary 
caretaker,6 or in favor of joint custody to both parents.7 Neither a primary-
caretaker presumption nor a joint-custody presumption has caught on in a 
significant way, however, in part because of the understandable reluctance by 
legislatures and courts to impose a particular postdivorce custodial arrangement 
on all families. The primary-caretaker presumption was adopted for a time in 
two states, but it was eventually abandoned in both.8 A number of jurisdictions 
have adopted statutory language that appears to favor joint custody,9 yet despite 
 
 4.  See Robert E. Emery et al., A Critical Assessment of Child Custody Evaluations: Limited 
Science and a Flawed System, 6 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 1 (2005); Steven K. Erickson et al., A Critical 
Examination of the Suitability and Limitations of Psychological Tests in Family Court, 45 FAM. CT. 
REV. 157, 170 (2007); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Emery, Gender Politics and Child Custody: The 
Puzzling Persistence of the Best-Interests Standard, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. no. 1, 2014 at 69, 91–
100; Timothy M. Tippins & Jeffrey P. Wittman, Empirical and Ethical Problems with Custody 
Recommendations, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 193, 214–17 (2005). 
 5.  See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19, § 1653(3) (2012 & Supp. 2013) (listing nineteen factors). 
 6.  See, e.g., David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in 
Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 559–61 (1984); Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional 
Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 770–74 (1988); 
Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition of Gender Difference in the Law: Revaluing the Caretaker 
Role, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 47 (2008). 
 7.  See, e.g., Ellen Canacakos, Joint Custody as a Fundamental Right, in JOINT CUSTODY AND 
SHARED PARENTING 223, 223–34 (Jay Folberg ed., 1984). 
 8.  See Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 712 (Minn. 1985) (adopting primary-caretaker 
presumption), superseded by statute, MINN. STAT. § 518.17(1)(a)(3) (2006) (best-interests standard); 
Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981) (adopting primary-caretaker presumption), 
superseded by statute, W. VA. CODE § 48-9-206(a) (2009) (approximation standard). 
 9.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-152(a) (2011) (“The Court shall in every case consider joint 
custody . . . .”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West 2013) (“The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the 
public policy of this State to assure minor children of frequent and continuing contact with both parents 
after the parents have separated . . . and that it is in the public interest to encourage parents to share 
the rights and responsibilities of child rearing in order to effect this policy.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
124.2(B) (2013) (“The court shall assure minor children of frequent and continuing contact with both 
parents, when appropriate, and encourage parents so share in the responsibilities of rearing their 
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robust advocacy efforts, the commitment to joint custody has been more 
rhetorical than substantive. Only five jurisdictions now have a joint-custody 
preference or presumption that operates regardless of whether the parents have 
agreed to it, and in nearly all of these jurisdictions the preference or 
presumption is overcome if the court finds that joint custody is not in the best 
interests of the child.10 Florida’s statute contains the strongest preference, 
requiring the court to make a finding of detriment if it does not order joint 
custody,11 but in Florida, the joint-custody preference appears to mean little. 
There is no presumption for “any specific time-sharing schedule,” and Florida 
law provides that “the court shall order sole parental responsibility for a minor 
child to one parent, with or without time-sharing with the other parent if it is in 
the best interests of the minor child.”12 The ambivalence toward joint custody 
conforms to public opinion, which tends to favor joint fifty–fifty physical 
custody in principle, but to abandon that principle when one parent has 
exercised substantially more caretaking responsibility for the child than the 
other.13 At least two states have eliminated their joint-custody preference in 
recent years,14 and the number of states explicitly disfavoring joint custody has 
 
children.”) 
 10.  See D.C. CODE § 16-914(a)(2)(3) (2001) (presumption that joint custody is in the best interest 
of the child is rebuttable on best-interests grounds); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717B(4) (2006) (“[T]here 
shall be a presumption that joint custody is in the best interests of a minor child,” “absent a 
preponderance of the evidence to the contrary”); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 132 (2013) (absent an 
agreement, or in cases when the agreement is not in the best interests of the child, court shall award 
custody to parents jointly); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1 (2006) (establishing a presumption that joint 
custody is in the best interests of a child, subject to consideration of best-interests factors). There are 
ten states that have a presumption in favor of joint custody only when the parents agree to it. See ALA. 
CODE § 30-3-152(a) (2011); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3080 (West 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-56a (2009); 
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 1653(2)(A) (2012 & Supp. 2013); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(4) (2013); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.490(1) (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4(d) (West 2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 
107.169(3)–(4) (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(A)(i) (2010); see also MINN. STAT. § 
518.17(2) (2014) (stating a preference in favor of joint custody, but if one of the parents objects to it, 
allowing joint custody only if the court makes findings explaining why joint custody is in the child’s best 
interests). Two states require the court to make findings explaining a decision not to order joint custody 
if a parent requests it. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.26a(1) (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.480(3)(a) 
(2010). This list does not include states that have a presumption or preference in favor of legal custody. 
See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 598.41(2) (2001 & Supp. 2013); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 153.131(b), 153.252 
(West 2008); WIS. STAT. § 767.41(2)(a)–(am) (2009 & Supp. 2013). 
 11.  FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(c)(2) (Supp. 2013). 
 12.  FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(c)(1). In 2008 and 2009, “visitation” was changed to “time-sharing.” Id. 
Recent legislation to establish a presumption of fifty–fifty joint physical custody in Florida (among 
other things) was vetoed by the governor. See Florida Gov. Scott Vetoes Bill that Would End Permanent 
Alimony in State, FOX NEWS (May 2, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/05/02/florida-gov-
scott-vetoes-bill-that-would-end-permanent-alimony-in-state/. 
 13.  See Sanford L. Braver et al., Lay Judgments About Child Custody After Divorce, 17 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 212 (2011). For a description of some of the various ways that courts have watered 
down stated policies in favor of joint custody, see PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.08 Reporter’s Notes to Cmt. a (2002). 
 14.  Czapranski v. Czapranski, 63 P.3d 499, 507 (Mont. 2003) (stating that Montana’s previous 
presumption in favor of joint custody was repealed); Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428, 432 (Utah. 
Ct. App. 1991) (describing elimination of Utah’s rebuttable presumption favoring joint legal custody by 
the 1990 Utah legislature). 
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grown from two15 to six.16 
In 2000, in a comprehensive effort to promote determinacy, fairness, and 
good outcomes across a wide range of family dissolution matters, including 
child custody, the American Law Institute (ALI) adopted the Principles of the 
Law of Family Dissolution (Principles).17 The Principles adopted an approach to 
custody similar to the “approximation standard,” proposed in 1992 by Elizabeth 
Scott.18 Under this approach, if parents cannot agree on an allocation of 
custodial responsibility, the court should allocate that responsibility in a way 
that “approximates the proportion of time each parent spent performing 
caretaking functions for the child prior to the parents’ separation.”19 At the 
heart of this approach is reliance on the circumstances of the family itself, not a 
commitment to one particular postdissolution arrangement. Under the ALI 
Principles, if one parent has been the primary caretaker, that role, and the role 
of the secondary caretaker, presumptively should continue, roughly in 
proportion to each parent’s past caretaking responsibility. Likewise, if both 
parents participated equally in the child’s day-to-day caretaking, the 
continuation of this shared responsibility is assumed to be in the child’s best 
interests. 
Past caretaking has both adjudicative and substantive virtues as a 
determinant of a child’s best interests. In terms of adjudication, it requires the 
determination of past facts, which courts are accustomed to doing, rather than 
speculations about the future, which they are not. Because a past-caretaking 
factor is more determinate than factors relating to the quality of parenting styles 
or abilities, it reduces the opportunity for judges to rely on their own biases 
about childrearing, whether those biases be idiosyncratic or conventional. And 
it reduces the incentives for parents to engage experts to criticize and 
undermine one another with respect to their parenting efforts and their 
relationships with their children. Some critics argue that the past caretaking 
simply gives parents another thing to argue about and thus increases rather than 
 
 15.  See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.08 Reporter’s Notes to Cmt. a (2002) (citing statutes of Oregon, OR. REV. 
STAT. § 107.169(3) (1999), and Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665(a) (2002)). 
 16.  See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101(a)(1)(A)(i) (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364(3) (2011); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 107.169(1)(3) (2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-160 (1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665(a) 
(2010 & Supp. 2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(B) (Supp. 2013). 
 17.  In addition to the allocation of caretaking and decisionmaking responsibilities for children, the 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2002) 
address spousal support, property division, child support, agreements, and nonmarital relationships. In 
full disclosure, the author of this article was a Reporter for Chapter Two, which addresses child 
custody. Because these areas of law are primarily statutory rather than common law, the proposals are 
called “Principles,” rather than a “Restatement.” The Principles were adopted by the ALI Membership 
in 2000, and published in a single, final volume in 2002. Id. 
 18.  See Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 
615, 617–18, 630–56 (1992). 
 19.  PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 
2.08(1) (2002). 
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reduces strategic behavior by parents.20 The evidence of this claim, however, 
comes from self-reports by parents in cases in which custody evaluations have 
become necessary—that is, cases in which parents are unable to settle custody 
matters on their own.21 For such parents, the question typically is not whether 
they will fight with each other, but what they will fight about. Given the choice, 
it seems preferable for parents to disagree over questions of fact that courts can 
resolve, rather than over often impossible judgments about who is the better 
parent or what makes for a more successful childhood.22 
Substantively, past caretaking is a reasonable proxy for the less determinate 
factors that are generally thought to be related to a child’s best interests. Past 
caretaking will tend to correspond with the child’s emotional bonds to the 
parents, parental abilities, and the child’s need for stability and continuity. Past 
caretaking also takes into account the individual circumstances of the child. 
When a court approximates past caretaking patterns, a child who has had a 
primary caretaker will maintain that primary caretaker after the parents’ 
separation, whereas a child who has enjoyed equal caretaking from each parent 
can expect that arrangement to continue to the extent practicable. An 
additional advantage is that past caretaking arrangements reflect the lived 
expectations of the parents themselves. To be sure, the parents’ separation 
changes the circumstances on which these expectations were based. 
Nonetheless, the Principles assume that, as between the parents and the child, 
the parents are in the best position to take the actions necessary to support their 
expectations, and to manage those expectations when they are frustrated. 
Exceptions from the past-caretaking standard are available (1) to ensure that 
each parent has some reasonable time with the child, even if he or she has not 
had significant involvement in the child’s daily care,23 (2) to implement parental 
agreements, which the Principles strongly favor,24 and (3) to take account of 
other relevant factors when they clearly outweigh the significance of past 
caretaking, such as domestic violence.25 
 
 20.  See Mary Jean Dolan & Daniel J. Hynan, Fighting Over Bedtime Stories: An Empirical Study 
of the Risks of Valuing Quantity Over Quality in Child Custody Decisions, 38 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 
(forthcoming Aug. 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2253061; see 
also Gaia Bernstein & Zvi Triger, Over-Parenting, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1221, 1244 (2011) (arguing 
that an emphasis on past caretaking causes parents to engage in “over-parenting”). 
 21.  See Dolan & Hynan, supra note 20 (describing methodology involving questionnaire surveys 
by ninety-four parents). 
 22.  Katharine T. Bartlett, Preference, Presumption, Predisposition, and Common Sense: From 
Traditional Custody Doctrines to the American Law Institute’s Family Dissolution Project, 36 FAM. L.Q. 
11, 24–25 (2002); Scott, supra note 18, at 639–43. 
 23.  PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 
2.08(1)(a) (2002). 
 24.  Id. §§ 2.06, 2.08(e). 
 25.  Id. § 2.11. A court may also depart from the approximation standard to take account of a 
child’s (especially an older child’s) “firm and reasonable preferences,” “keep siblings together,” 
“protect the child” from harm caused when past caretaking clearly does not align with the child’s 
emotional attachments of the parents’ abilities, avoid “extremely impractical” arrangements, 
accommodate the relocation of a parent, and otherwise “avoid substantial and almost certain harm to 
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In a number of important respects, the Principles captured trends that had 
already begun when the Principles were drafted, and have continued since then. 
For example, a central focus of the Principles is the emphasis on parents 
themselves resolving their conflicts over children. The Principles require 
parenting plans, services to assist parents in developing those plans, protection 
of domestic-violence victims in the bargaining process, and judicial deference to 
parental agreements.26 Many states had already moved in this direction and 
more states have continued to do so.27 The ALI Principles also built on the 
existing momentum in favor of enhancing protection for victims of domestic 
violence28 and prohibiting consideration of race, ethnicity, sex, religion, sexual 
orientation, extramarital sexual conduct, and financial circumstances in custody 
 
the child.” Id. § 2.08(1)(b)–(d), (f)–(h). 
 26.  Id. §§ 2.05–2.07. 
 27.  At the time the Principles were adopted by the ALI, nine states mandated the submission of 
parenting plans regardless of the form of custody sought, and three additional statutes required a 
parenting plan if the parties sought joint custody. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY 
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.05 Reporter’s Notes to Cmt. b (2002). Six 
more states left the ordering of parenting plans to the court’s discretion. Id. Today, at least fifteen 
additional states have passed parenting-plan bills—twelve of these requiring the submission of 
parenting plans, and three additional states make them discretionary with the court. See, e.g., CAL. 
FAM. CODE § 3040(a)(1) (West 2004) (discretionary); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(1) (2013) 
(discretionary); MO. REV. STAT. § 452.310(8) (Supp. 2013) (mandatory); WASH. REV. CODE § 
26.09.181(1)(a) (2005) (mandatory). For a review of parenting-education programs, see Jill R. Bowers 
et al., A Review of Online Divorce Education Programs, 49 FAM. CT. REV. 776 (2011) and Susan L. 
Pollet & Melissa Lombreglia, A Nationwide Survey of Mandatory Parent Education, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 
375 app. A (2008) (summarizing provisions in forty-six states for parenting education, as of September 
10, 2007). Mandatory parenting education has been upheld in the courts against challenges that it 
violates a parent’s substantive due process rights. See, e.g., Dutkiewicz v. Dutkiewicz, 957 A.2d 821, 835 
(Conn. 2008); Nelson v. Nelson, 954 P.2d 1219, 1226 (Okla. 1998). With respect to protections from 
domestic violence in the negotiation of parental agreements, see Joan B. Kelly & Michael P. Johnson, 
Differentiation Among Types of Intimate Partner Violence: Research Update and Implications for 
Interventions, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 476, 492 (2008) (“[C]ourt-based mediation programs have become 
increasingly responsive to the legitimate challenges and questions raised by women’s advocates, and 
incorporated a variety of new screening and service procedures to protect victims of partner violence, 
including separate sessions, different arrival and departure times, metal detectors, referrals to 
appropriate treatment agencies, presence of support persons, and monitoring of no-contact orders.”) 
and Susan Landrum, The Ongoing Debate About Mediation in the Context of Domestic Violence: A Call 
for Empirical Studies of Mediation Effectiveness, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 425, 434 (2011) 
(“[M]ost mediation programs have developed screening protocols to ensure that cases are appropriate 
for mediation.”). As for the trend in favor of deference to parental agreements, see Linda Jellum, 
Parents Know Best: Revising Our Approach to Parental Custody Agreements, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 615, 634–
35 (2004) (describing a move among states toward presuming that arrangements agreed-upon by both 
parents are in the child’s best interests). 
 28.  See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 2.03 Reporter’s Notes to Cmt. h, 2.11 Reporter’s Notes (2002); Leslie Joan 
Harris, Failure to Protect From Exposure to Domestic Violence in Private Custody Contests, 44 FAM. 
L.Q. 169, 170 (2010) (“Today, statutes in all fifty states and the District of Columbia require courts to 
consider domestic violence committed by one parent against the other in resolving a custody or 
visitation dispute between parents. A significant number of states also have statutes or case law that 
require courts to consider the occurrence of violence in a child’s household or proposed household in 
resolving such disputes, regardless of who commits the violence or at whom it is directed.”). 
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decisionmaking.29 In addition, the ALI Principles joined the emerging trend to 
substitute the traditional win–lose categories of custody (win) and visitation 
(lose) with terminology that reflects the assumption that both parents have a 
meaningful caretaking role.30 At the time the Principles were adopted by the 
ALI, a handful of states had already replaced the traditional custody and 
visitation language with less all-or-nothing terminology, such as custodial 
responsibility, decisionmaking responsibility, parenting time, and residential 
provisions.31 Since then, a number of other states have moved in this direction.32 
Although the ALI Principles followed a developing consensus among the 
states, the provisions for allocating custody were highly controversial and the 
subject of intense debate, both before and after their adoption by the ALI.33 
 
 29.  See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.12 Reporter’s Notes (2002). With respect to gender, states increasingly 
disallow consideration of the gender of a parent in a custody case. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 
107.137(5) (2013) (“No preference in custody shall be given to the mother over the father for the sole 
reason that she is the mother, nor shall any preference be given to the father over the mother for the 
sole reason that he is the father.”); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5328(b) (Supp. 2013) (“[N]o party shall 
receive preference based upon gender . . . .”). Sexual orientation and extramarital sexual conduct 
typically are not addressed in custody statutes. An exception is the District of Columbia. See D.C. 
CODE § 16-914(a)(1)(A) (2001) (stating that sexual orientation shall “not be a conclusive 
consideration”). A majority of courts faced with the issue, however, prohibit consideration of such 
matters unless specific harm to the child is demonstrated. See, e.g., Mongerson v. Mongerson, 678 
S.E.2d 891 (Ga. 2009) (holding that it was an abuse of discretion to order a homosexual father to 
refrain from exposing the children to his homosexual partners and friends); M.A.T. v. G.S.T., 989 A.2d 
11, 17–18 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (en banc) (holding that courts may not rely on “unsupported 
preconceptions and prejudices” in concluding that “the traditional heterosexual household is superior 
to that of the household of a parent involved in a same sex relationship”); Parker v. Parker, 986 S.W.2d 
557 (Tenn. 1999) (holding that it was error for the trial court to rely on “marital transgressions” of the 
mother relating to an extramarital relationship); see also Todd Brower, It’s Not Just Shopping, Urban 
Lofts, and the Lesbian Gay-by Boom, 17 AM U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 17 (2009) (arguing that 
courts will increasingly interpret custody and visitation standards without considering the sexual 
orientation of the parents). But see Nancy D. Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian and Gay Parents 
Redux: The Irrelevance of Constitutional Principles, 60 UCLA REV. DISC. 226 (2013) (demonstrating 
that, under harm test, courts continue to penalize gay and lesbian parents in custody cases). 
 30.  See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(2)–(4) Reporter’s Notes to Cmt. g (2002); id. § 2.03(2)–(4) (defining 
custodial responsibility and decisionmaking responsibility). 
 31.  See id. at Cmts. e–f & Reporter’s Notes to Cmts. e–f (explaining shift in terminology); see also 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124 (2012) (“allocation of parental responsibilities,” “determination of 
parenting time,” and “allocation of decisionmaking responsibility”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 722 
(2013) (“legal custody” and “residential arrangements”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (LexisNexis 
2013) (“allocation of parental rights and responsibilities” and “shared parenting”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 
36-6-108 (2010) (“parent spending the greater amount of time with the child” and “parent with whom 
the child resides the majority of the time”). 
 32.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403 (Supp. 2012) (effective Jan. 1, 2013) (substituting 
“legal decision-making” and “parenting time” for custody language); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-3203 
(Supp. 2012) (“custody, residency and parenting time”); MINN. STAT. § 518.175 (2006 & Supp. 2013) 
(“parenting time”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2923 (2011) (“parenting arrangements”); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 461-A:6 (2012) (“parental rights and responsibilities”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-091-06.2 (2009) 
(“parental rights and responsibilities”); W. VA. CODE § 48-9-205 (2009 & Supp. 2013) (“custodial 
responsibility” and “decision-making responsibility”). 
 33.  In addition to the reporters who had the drafting responsibilities, judges, academics, and 
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Some saw the ALI Principles as a child-centered breakthrough that takes the 
individual circumstances of the family into account without the uncertainty and 
biases of existing custody standards.34 Other reactions dismissed the Principles 
as unfair to fathers, uninformed about the needs of children especially as those 
needs change over time, unappreciative of the important role that both parents 
play in a child’s upbringing, unrealistic in seeking to preserve a division in roles 
that the parties’ separation often makes impossible, and irrelevant to 
contemporary policy debates.35 
 
practitioners from the ALI participated in a multilayered consultative process. Participants included a 
Members Consultative Group of over 100 individuals, a ten-member Judges Consultative Group, a 
twenty-seven-member set of advisers, the Council (or governing body) of the ALI, and, ultimately, the 
full ALI membership. These individuals came from a broad spectrum of backgrounds and held a 
variety of beliefs about the values and assumptions that should inform the law’s resolution of disputes 
over children. Debates, which occurred at the various committee meetings and at four different ALI 
annual meetings reflected a wide range of views, and were described by the ALI Director, Lance 
Liebman, as “vigorous,” “lengthy,” and “spirited.” Lance Liebman, Director’s Foreword to PRINCIPLES 
OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2002). The final 
product, including commentary, occupies almost 1200 pages. 
 34.  See, e.g., Christy M. Buchanan & Parissa L. Jahromi, A Psychological Perspective on Shared 
Custody Arrangements, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 419, 434 (2008) (arguing that the “no ‘one size fits 
all’” approximation approach of the ALI Principles is superior to shared-custody promotion in 
promoting the best outcomes for children); Kathy T. Graham, How the ALI Child Custody Principles 
Help Eliminate Gender and Sexual Orientation Bias from Child Custody Determinations, 8 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y 301, 329–31 (2002) (applauding gender neutrality of the ALI standards); Herma 
Hill Kay, No-Fault Divorce and Child Custody: Chilling out the Gender Wars, 36 FAM. L.Q. 27, 40 
(2002) (praising ALI standards for offering “both mothers and fathers a way to retreat from this 
particular battlefield [of custody law] with their honor intact”); David D. Meyer, Partners, Care Givers, 
and the Constitutional Substance of Parenthood, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE 
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 47, 66 (Robin 
Fretwell Wilson ed. 2006) (Principles have given children raised in nontraditional families “the most 
that likely can be given them in a society that remains deeply respectful of traditional parental roles and 
prerogatives”); see also Robert F. Kelly & Shawn L. Ward, Allocating Custodial Responsibility at 
Divorce: Social Science Research and the American Law Institute’s Approximation Rule, 40 FAM. CT. 
REV. 350, 355–59 (2002) (advocating an attachment theory consistent with ALI’s approximation 
standard, but stating that more research would be needed to test assumption that there is a strong 
relationship between direct caretaking functions and secure parent–child attachments); Marygold S. 
Melli, The American Law Institute Principles of Family Dissolution, the Approximation Rule and 
Shared-Parenting, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 347, 353 (2005) (arguing that although the ALI Principles could 
have been more detailed on some issues, the approximation approach “avoids some of the major 
problems associated with the traditional best interest standard”); Molly Sanders, Should Child Custody 
Awards Be Based on Past Caretaking?: The Effect of the Approximation Standard Ten Years After its 
Adoption, 30 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J., Fall 2010, at 17, 25–26 (arguing that the approximation standard is 
the best alternative for resolving child custody, but that more study is required in order to give courts 
more guidance in applying it). 
 35.  See, e.g., Michael R. Clisham & Robin Fretwell Wilson, American Law Institute’s Principles of 
the Law of Family Dissolution, Eight Years After Adoption: Guiding Principles or Obligatory 
Footnote?, 42 FAM. L.Q. 573, 576, 596 (2008) (stating that ALI Principles are more of an “obligatory 
footnote” than an actual influence on courts and legislatures); Lyn R. Greenberg et al., The Problem 
with Presumptions—A Review and Commentary, in RELOCATION ISSUES IN CHILD CUSTODY CASES 
139, 148 (Philip M. Stahl & Leslie M. Drozd, eds. 2006) (explaining that post-separation need for both 
parents to work and other factors mean that “pre-separation parenting is not necessarily predictive of 
post-separation parenting”); Patrick Parkinson, The Past Caretaking Standard in Comparative 
Perspective, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 446, 455 (2006) (criticizing past-caretaking 
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The sharpest critique of the Principles focused on their reception by courts 
and legislatures. Michael Clisham and Robin Fretwell Wilson claimed, based on 
their review of forty-eight cases citing to Chapter Two in the years following the 
ALI’s adoption of the Principles, that the impact of the Principles was “slight,” 
“mixed,” and “anemic,” and that the recommendations of the Principles “are 
rejected more often than accepted by a ratio of 1.5 to 1.”36 This conclusion is 
puzzling, and not supported by the researchers’ data. First, as the researchers 
acknowledge, the cases included in their 1.5-to-1 ratio (which encompasses 
cases from all chapters of the Principles, not just Chapter Two) comprise less 
than half of the cases studied.37 The majority of cases were, by the researchers’ 
own account, “neutral.”38 Second, among the custody cases identified as 
“negative” toward the Principles were some that, although they did not adopt 
the Principles per se, applied reasoning that closely mirrored it. For example, 
courts in one of the two custody cases that the researchers coded as negative 
because the courts stated that custody standards were for the legislature, not the 
courts, to determine,39 proceeded to apply standards that were, in fact, very 
similar to the ALI Principles, using the same rationale.40 Most of the cases 
coded as “neutral” rather than “positive” cited the ALI Principles to describe 
the majority rule, support a concurring opinion, further support a decision that 
would have been reached without the ALI Principles, address an issue not 
reached by the court for procedural reasons, or provide evidence of a social 
phenomenon.41 Notably, of the forty-eight custody cases in their study, the 
 
standard for, among other things, being “prejudicial to the primary earning parent in role-divided 
marriages,” and for not doing enough to promote shared parenting); Shelley A. Riggs, Is the 
Approximation Rule in the Child’s Best Interests?: A Critique from the Perspective of Attachment 
Theory, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 481, 486–89 (2005) (critiquing the assumptions of the approximation rule 
from the standpoint of attachment theory and arguing that the ALI does not provide enough protection 
for children whose attachments do not track parental-caretaking patterns); Richard A. Warshak, 
Parenting By the Clock: The Best-Interest-of-the-Child Standard, Judicial Discretion, and the American 
Law Institute’s “Approximation Rule,” 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 83, 85 (2011) (“The approximation rule is 
difficult to apply, creates a new focus for disputing parents, renders a poor estimate of parents’ 
contributions to their child’s best interest, and overlooks parents’ intangible, yet significant, 
contributions to their child’s well-being.”). 
 36.  Clisham & Wilson, supra note 35, at 576, 577. The forty-eight cases were decided between 1998 
and 2008. Id. 
 37.  Id. at 597 (only forty-three cases were identified as either negative or positive). 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Clisham & Wilson, supra note 35, at 597 (code 7). 
 40.  See In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 697 (Iowa 2007) (declining to adopt ALI’s 
approximation standard explicitly because “[a]ny wholesale adoption of the approximation rule would 
require legislative action,” but agreeing that “the successful caregiving by one spouse in the past is a 
strong predictor that future care of the children will be of the same quality,” and that by “focusing on 
historic patterns of caregiving, the approximation rule provides a relatively objective factor” that 
“rejects a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach and recognizes the diversity of family life”). In the other custody 
case coded as acknowledging the prerogative of legislatures in this area, the court also states that the 
applicable test was “very similar” to the factors used by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in In re Custody 
of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995), from which the ALI Principles were drawn. See In re R.A. & 
J.M., 891 A.2d 564, 580 (N.H. 2006). 
 41.  Clisham & Wilson, supra note 35, at 596–697 (codes 3, 5, 10, 11 & 12). The “neutral” group 
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researchers identify only one case that represented a “flat out” rejection of the 
Principles.42  
Both judicially and legislatively, past caretaking is an increasingly important 
factor in custody cases. Despite this fact, the majority of jurisdictions do not 
prioritize past caretaking and, as a result, custody decisions continue to be 
inconsistent and unpredictable. In this article, I demonstrate this continued 
indeterminacy not by coding and counting cases—a method that tends to 
reinforce the order it presupposes—but by qualitatively analyzing of various 
outlier cases in three areas: (1) initial custody cases, (2) cases to modify custody 
as a result of the relocation of a parent, and (3) custody petitions by third 
parties who have functioned as the child’s parent. Through this analysis, I show 
that courts often rely heavily on past caretaking in initial custody 
determinations and relocation decisions, but that insofar as the law does not 
require a priority on this factor, courts sometimes reach results that are 
unpredictable and difficult to explain by any consistent, child-centered 
principles. I show further that in third-party custody and visitation cases, courts 
and legislatures have developed tests for functional parenthood that are highly 
specific to past caretaking, and as a result yield relatively determinate results. I 
urge further prioritization of past caretaking across the spectrum of custody 
cases to assure more consistent and more child-centered outcomes. 
II 
INITIAL CUSTODY DECISIONS 
Applying a variety of child-custody statutes, courts in custody disputes have 
long tended to favor the parent who has been the child’s primary caretaker. At 
the same time, custody cases decided under the best-interests standard 
sometimes turn, idiosyncratically, on factors that matter greatly in some cases, 
and not at all in others. In this part I provide detailed examples of this 
inconsistency in jurisdictions that use various statutory approaches. I then 
contrast the law in a handful of states—West Virginia, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Oregon, and South Carolina—that, by statute or case law, have prioritized past 
caretaking. These jurisdictions have generated few appellate decisions, and 
these decisions are relatively consistent and predictable. 
A. Best-Interests Jurisdictions Without Priority on Past Caretaking 
A number of jurisdictions decide custody cases under a best-interests 
standard without any specific criteria except as relates to domestic violence.43 In 
 
also included citations in dissenting opinions, id. (code seven), although the cases in this category did 
not necessarily reach results inconsistent with the ALI Principles. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 
57 (2000) (finding it unconstitutional to award visitation to a grandparent over the object of a parent 
based on a best-interests standard). 
 42.  Clisham & Wilson, supra note 35, 613 app. 6 at 617. The case is Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 
A.2d 73, 74 (Md. 2008). See further discussion of de facto parenthood infra Part IV. 
 43.  See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-203 (LexisNexis 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24 
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these jurisdictions, courts tend to award primary custody to the parent who has 
been the child’s primary caretaker, but from time to time a court will give more 
weight to one or another consideration, thereby reaching an unexpected, 
contrary result. 
New York is a case in point. The New York custody statute requires courts 
to enter custody orders as, “in the court’s discretion, justice requires, having 
regard to the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties and to the 
best interests of the child.”44 Courts in the state have generally given strong 
weight to the parents’ respective past caretaking roles, despite the presence of 
other considerations.45 In any particular case, however, a court may decide to 
give more weight to another consideration. In one case, for example, the court 
decided that the primary caretaker had moved too frequently and had a 
“chaotic personal life.”46 In New York, a positive factor in one case might be 
construed negatively in another. For example, one court viewed a father’s 
decision to live with his parents for financial reasons as a positive indication of 
the greater resources the father could offer the child, in comparison to the 
mother, who lived in a trailer where the child did not have her own bedroom.47 
Another New York court, in contrast, viewed the fact that the mother moved in 
with her parents for financial reasons as an indication of irresponsibility on her 
part.48 
South Dakota custody law similarly requires only that courts “be guided by 
consideration of what appears to be for the best interests of the child in respect 
to the child’s temporal and moral welfare.”49 Under this statute, South Dakota 
courts, like New York courts, typically conclude that the child’s interests are 
best served by continued custodial care by the primary caretaker50 but judges 
are not required to give this factor any particular weight, and in some cases that 
are hard to distinguish from others, they may subordinate past caretaking to 
 
(2013); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney 2010 & Supp. 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2 (2013); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 109(A) (2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-45 
(2004). 
 44.  N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney 2010 & Supp. 2013). 
 45.  See, e.g., Sitts v. Sitts, 902 N.Y.S.2d 274 (App. Div. 2010) (overturning custody award to the 
father because the mother was the children’s primary caregiver); In re Marrero v. Centeno, 896 
N.Y.S.2d 157 (App. Div. 2010) (reversing custody order to the father because the mother was the 
child’s primary care provider since the child’s birth); In re Larkin v. White, 884 N.Y.S.2d 90 (App. Div. 
2009) (reversing custody award to the father, based on the fact that the six-year-old child had lived with 
the mother his entire life). 
 46.  In re Siler v. Wright, 882 N.Y.S.2d 574, 575–76 (App. Div. 2009). 
 47.  Dudniak v. Olmstead, 761 N.Y.S.2d 714, 716 (App. Div. 2003). 
 48.  Storch v. Storch, 725 N.Y.S.2d 399, 402 (App. Div. 2001). Of the five judges on the reviewing 
court who unanimously affirmed the trial court order in Storch, two of them joined in affirming the trial 
court in Dudniak v. Olmstead. Compare id. (majority opinion of Crew III, J., Lahtinen, J. Mercure, J., 
Mugglin, J. & Rose, J.), with Dudniak, 761 N.Y.S.2d 714 (majority opinion of Carpinello, J., Crew III, 
J., Kane, J., Mugglin, J. & Spain, J.). 
 49.  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-45 (2004). 
 50.  See, e.g., Haanen v. Haanen, 769 N.W.2d 836 (S.D. 2009); Arneson v. Arneson, 670 N.W.2d 
904 (S.D. 2003); Price v. Price, 611 N.W.2d 425, 433–34 (S.D. 2000). 
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other factors. In Kreps v. Kreps,51 for example, the parties did not contest that 
the mother was the primary caretaker of the couple’s three children at the time 
of the litigation,52 and the custody evaluator recommended custody in the 
mother.53 The trial court awarded custody to the father, however, based on the 
fact that the father’s work schedule was more flexible and because of a few 
relatively minor transgressions on the mother’s part. These transgressions 
included taking the children to medical appointments without telling the father 
until after the visits, failing to share all information about the children’s daycare 
arrangements during the litigation, and missing three scheduled visitations over 
a twelve-week period due to her “unwillingness or inability to travel.”54 The trial 
court believed that these actions demonstrated a “pattern” of unilateral action 
on the mother’s part, a “profound lack of ability or willingness to maturely 
encourage and provide frequent and meaningful contact between the children 
and [the father,]” and less commitment to preparing the children “for 
responsible adulthood” than the father had demonstrated when he provided 
“exemplary modeling of what it means to be a good parent, loving spouse, and 
responsible citizen.”55 Under the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard 
applied in custody matters, the appellate court deferred to the trial court’s 
evaluation of the evidence and left standing a decision that the dissenting justice 
described as premised on nothing more than “one-sided inferences and 
contrived inadequacies.”56 “Repeatedly, . . . we see language in the findings 
describing the mother as having ‘demonstrated a pattern,’ ‘a profound lack of 
ability or willingness,’ a ‘pronounced inability or unwillingness,’ all raising 
‘serious concerns,’ manifesting ‘deficiencies’”—[findings] not supported by the 
record.57 Despite the mother being faulted for not granting the father additional 
or extra time with the child, the dissenting justice observed, “nowhere in the 
findings is there a single statement that the mother violated a court order on 
visitation.”58 In giving free rein to the trial court to interpret the actions of the 
primary caretaker parent through its own views about good parenting, Kreps is 
not an isolated example. One recent case turned on the fact that the mother 
“heavily favored therapy over playtime and time with the family.”59 
 
 
 51.  778 N.W.2d 835 (S.D. 2010). 
 52.  Id. at 842, 844–45. 
 53.  Id. at 841, 844. 
 54.  Id. at 840–41. 
 55.  Id. at 842. 
 56.  Id. at 849 (Konenkamp, J., dissenting). 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. at 847 (majority opinion). 
 59.  See Schieffler v. Schieffler, 826 N.W.2d 627, 635 (S.D. 2013); see also Walker v. Walker, 720 
N.W.2d 67, 73–74 (S.D. 2006) (awarding the father physical custody rather than the mother mostly 
because, although the mother stayed home most of the time with the children, “the children often 
joined their father for farm work and while he was trucking” and “also enjoyed spending time with 
their paternal grandparents”). 
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In contrast to the open-ended custody statutes found in some states, many 
jurisdictions provide specific criteria to help guide the determination of the 
child’s best interests. Perhaps surprisingly, however, the pattern of cases is 
similar. For example, North Dakota law provides twelve separate factors, which 
in 2006 included “[t]he length of time the child has lived in a stable satisfactory 
environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity.”60 This law was 
interpreted by the state’s highest court to mean that although “a primary 
caretaker enjoys no paramount or presumptive status under the best interests of 
the child factors, . . . primary caretakers ‘deserve recognition’ in custody 
determinations” from which a court might conclude that stronger emotional ties 
exist.61 Nonetheless, in Klein v. Larson,62 the North Dakota Supreme Court 
overturned a custody order to the mother, who had raised her ten-year-old child 
alone for the large majority of the child’s life, on the ground that the mother 
had moved six to ten times and kept changing jobs.63 Although the trial court 
had found that the mother’s moves were not detrimental to the child, the 
appellate court determined that a showing of harm was not required, and that in 
“engrafting” a harm requirement, as well as in counting the days in which the 
child had been in custody of each parent, the trial court had applied “an 
erroneous view of the law” and was therefore not entitled to deference.64 In 
another North Dakota case, the state supreme court affirmed a modification of 
custody from the mother, who had been the child’s only primary caregiver, to 
the father, who had not regularly exercised visitation, because the court 
believed that the father’s lifestyle was more stable, in comparison to the 
mother’s “chronic unemployment.”65 The court particularly disapproved of the 
mother moving back in with her parents for financial reasons after she became 
pregnant by her unemployed spouse.66 
 
 
 60.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1)(d) (2006) (amended in 2009 to read, “The sufficiency and 
stability of each parent’s home environment, the impact of extended family, the length of time the child 
has lived in each parent’s home, and the desirability of maintaining continuity in the child’s home and 
community,” id. § 14-09-06.2(1)(d) (2013)). 
 61.  Heinle v. Heinle, 777 N.W.2d 590, 596–97 (N.D. 2010); see also Doll v. Doll, 794 N.W.2d 425, 
430–33 (N.D. 2011); Lindberg v. Lindberg, 770 N.W.2d 252, 256–61 (N.D. 2009). 
 62.  724 N.W.2d 565 (N.D. 2006). 
 63.  Id. at 567, 569. 
 64.  Id. at 569–70. In addition, the appellate court rejected the trial court’s conclusion that the 
mother had the edge on moral fitness because the father was guilty of statutory rape of the mother. 
This rejection was based on a quibble with the trial court about the parties’ ages when they had sex, as 
well as the appellate court’s conclusion that moral fitness was determined not only by crimes of moral 
turpitude, in which the father might have engaged, but also by the kind of conduct in which the mother 
had engaged, including “regularly associat[ing] with people using methamphetamine” and a number of 
traffic violations. Id. at 571. 
 65.  Woods v. Ryan, 696 N.W.2d 508, 510, 513 (N.D. 2005). 
 66.  Id. The court also noted the mother’s arrest for driving with a suspended license and for 
possession of drug paraphernalia, and the mother’s one-month secret marriage. A strong dissent 
criticized the trial court’s reliance on factors that were not shown to have a harmful effect on the child. 
Id. at 514–21 (Maring, J., dissenting). 
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In Ohio, too, courts exercise their “broad discretion” to decide custody 
according to a long list of best-interests factors,67 which often results in custody 
awards to the primary caretaker.68 As in other states, however, Ohio courts 
sometimes decide that a factor deemed unimportant in one case will in another 
case override the primary-caretaker factor. For example, one court decided in 
favor of the father who had been less involved in the children’s upbringing 
because he “owns his own home, has been attentive to the needs of the two 
children, and[,] because he is retired, is available to care for the children.”69 A 
2012 Ohio appellate court affirmed a custody award to the father instead of the 
primary-caretaking mother because, despite a substantiated act of domestic 
violence by the father for which he served ten days in jail, custody with the 
father would allow the child to develop relationships with his grandparents, 
father, and stepmother, as compared to the mother, who lived only with her 
fiancé.70 That same year, an appellate court in Ohio affirmed a custody 
modification to the father because the primary-caretaking mother had a history 
of moving from one relationship to another, and the man with whom she lived 
“lacked character.”71 In still another 2012 case, custody was changed by the 
court because the thirteen-year-old child’s relationship with his mother and 
stepfather had become “strained.”72 
Quite a few state statutes now include past caretaking as a factor in their 
best-interests statutes. It might be expected that this more objective factor 
would make custody decisions more predictable and the outcomes of cases 
decided under these statutes do, in fact, usually favor a parent who has been 
raising the child on a day-to-day basis. Iowa law requiring consideration of 
“whether both parents have actively cared for the child before and since the 
separation,”73 for example, was interpreted in Hansen v. Hansen74 to focus on 
“historic patterns of caregiving,” because these patterns provide “a relatively 
objective” basis for decisionmaking,75 and reflect other, more intangible and 
hard-to-measure factors in the child’s well-being.76 Joint physical care, the court 
 
 67.  See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(F)(1) (LexisNexis 2013). 
 68.  See, e.g., Edwards v. Edwards, No. 25309, 2013 WL 209179 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2013); 
Heilman v. Heilman, No. 6-12-08, 2012 WL 5397596 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2012). The case often cited 
on the importance of the primary-caretaker factor in Ohio is In re Maxwell, 456 N.E.2d 1218 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1982). 
 69.  Williams-Booker v. Booker, Nos. 21752 & 21767, 2007 WL 2685057 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 14, 
2007). 
 70.  Seymour v. Hampton, No. 11CA821, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 4422, at *15 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 
16, 2012). 
 71.  Cure v. Cure, No. 2011 CA 73, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 2597, at *15 (Ohio Ct. App. June 29, 
2012) (affirming change of custody from mother to father). 
 72.  Hull v. Hull, No. 2011CA00155, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 834, at *9–10 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 27, 
2012) (modifying custody). 
 73.  IOWA CODE § 598.41(3)(d) (2013). 
 74.  Hansen v. Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 697 (Iowa 2007). 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. 
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reasoned, is most likely to be in the best interest of the child when “both 
parents have historically contributed to physical care in roughly the same 
proportion.”77 “Conversely, where one spouse has been the primary caregiver, 
the likelihood that joint physical care might be disruptive on the emotional 
development of the children increases.”78 Reliance on past caretaking also, the 
court further noted, respects the autonomy of families.79 
Nevertheless, although a number of subsequent appellate cases in Iowa also 
have relied on past caretaking patterns,80 other decisions have given less weight 
to them in favor of other, more erratic factors. An example is In re Marriage of 
Eldred, in which the father was given primary custodial responsibility for his 
children, solely because the mother had abruptly left the children with the 
father for a month while she went to another state with a person she had 
recently met on the Internet.81 The court found that the mother’s month-long 
absence was more significant than the fact that she had been the children’s 
primary caretaker, and that the father had himself been involved in 
pornography on the Internet, struggled with his finances, and kept the house in 
“disarray.”82 
Pennsylvania law requiring giving “weighted consideration” to various 
factors including past caretaking83 has also failed to yield predictable results. 
Some decisions in Pennsylvania have interpreted the statute to give priority to 
the parents’ past caretaking,84 but other courts have read the statute to require 
special weight only to those factors relating to the “safety of the child,” and to 
give courts free rein “to determine which factors are most salient and critical in 
each particular case.”85 Likewise, Nebraska case law designates primary 
caretaking as an important factor,86 but some courts have awarded custody to 
 
 77.  Id. at 697–98. 
 78.  Id. at 698. 
 79.  Id. at 697 (“The principle of approximation rejects a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach and recognizes 
the diversity of family life.”). 
 80.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Powers, No. 66 / 07-0006, 2008 Iowa LEXIS 71, at *5 (Iowa May 16, 
2008) (per curiam); In re Marriage of Ryland, No. 1-760 / 11-0125, 2011 Iowa App. LEXIS 1410, at *3 
(Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2011); In re Cooley, No. 1-208 / 10-1078, 2011 Iowa App. LEXIS 808, at *3 
(Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2011); In re Marriage of Russell, No. 1-102 / 10-1361, 2011 Iowa App. LEXIS 
219, at *7–8 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2011). 
 81.  In re Marriage of Eldred, No. 0-746 / 10-0362, 2010 Iowa App. LEXIS 1568, at *8–10 (Iowa Ct. 
App. Dec. 22, 2010). 
 82.  Id.; see also Hicks v. Foulks, No. 10-1497, 2011 WL 3925452, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 8, 
2011) (denying primary custody to primary caretaker because of her inability to “set aside her 
differences” with the father and the father’s ability to provide support to the child). 
 83.  See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5328(a)(3) (Supp. 2013). 
 84.  See, e.g., Wheeler v. Mazur, 793 A.2d 929, 935 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002). 
 85.  See, e.g., M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 339 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013); see also J.R.M. v. J.E.A., 33 
A.3d 647, 652 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) (reversing custody order to unmarried mother because it appeared 
to be based exclusively on the fact that child has been in the custody of the mother since birth and is 
breastfeeding, and did not consider other factors, such as the presence of extended family and which 
party could be more likely to encourage contact with the other). 
 86.  See, e.g., Molczyk v. Molczyk, 825 N.W.2d 435, 446 (Neb. 2013); Kamal v. Imroz, 759 N.W.2d 
914, 918 (Neb. 2009); Pohlmann v. Pohlmann, 824 N.W.2d 63, 69, 71 (Neb. Ct. App. 2012). 
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the less involved parent because, for example, the primary caregiving parent 
stayed out late with friends87 or because the court believed that the primary 
caregiver did not want to care for the child and acted like the child was a 
nuisance.88 In Tennessee, courts must consider the primary-caretaker factor and 
typically award custody to the primary caregiver.89 One Tennessee court, 
however, rejected an award of custody to the primary caregiver on the grounds 
that she might have been having a lesbian affair with the children’s babysitter,90 
and the mother in another case lost custody because she had had an 
extramarital relationship with her employer.91 In Mississippi, one factor courts 
must consider is which parent provided continuity of care before the 
separation.92 Despite this important factor, a primary parent lost custody in one 
case because she committed adultery, had an out-of-state boyfriend, and left it 
up to the father to attend to her son’s need for school tutoring.93 Similarly, 
although primary caregivers usually win custody disputes in Florida,94 a primary-
caretaker mother lost custody in one case because the judge was more 
impressed with the other parent’s “deep love” for his sons and the fact that he 
went on “numerous hunting and fishing trips” with them.95 In another case, the 
judge disapproved of the mother because she was “more oriented to career 
achievement than parenting.”96 
One final example is instructive. In 1987, Washington state adopted the 
Parenting Act of 1987, which required courts to give the greatest weight in 
custody cases to “whether a parent has taken greater responsibility for 
performing parenting functions relating to the daily needs of the child.”97 The 
leading state supreme court decision under the Parenting Act of 1987 was In re 
Marriage of Kovacs.98 In affirming an award of custody to the father rather than 
to the mother, who was a stay-at-home caregiver, the court in Kovacs weakened 
the force of the statute, first recharacterizing the greatest-weight factor as 
relating to the “child’s relationship with each parent” rather than to the past 
 
 87.  Williams v. Williams, No. A-07-1103, 2008 WL 5064933 (Neb. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2008). 
 88.  Jones v. Jones, No. A-12-157, 2012 WL 3600069 (Neb. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2012). 
 89.  See, e.g., Burden v. Burden, 250 S.W.3d 899 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007); Hodson v. Griffin, 210 
S.W.3d 568 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). 
 90.  Mobley v. Mobley, No. E2012-00390-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 1804189 (Tenn. Ct. App. April 
30, 2013). 
 91.  Parker v. Parker, 986 S.W.2d 557 (Tenn. 1999). 
 92.  See Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 1983) (en banc). 
 93.  See Flowers v. Flowers, 90 So. 3d 672 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012); see also Brumfield v. Brumfield, 
49 So. 3d 138 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (en banc) (refusing custody to the primary-caretaker mother, 
despite incident of domestic violence by father, because she suffered from depression following the 
suicide of her father and left more of the caretaking up to the father). 
 94.  See, e.g., Sacks v. Sacks, 991 So. 2d 922, 923–24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
 95.  Adair v. Adair, 720 So. 2d 316, 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
 96.  Kopec v. Severance, 658 So. 2d 1060, 1060 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). 
 97.  WASH. REV. CODE. § 26.09.187(3)(a)(i) (2001). 
 98.  854 P.2d 629 (Wash. 1993) (en banc). 
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performance of parenting functions, as set forth in the statute.99 The court went 
on to say that, although the language of the statute could be construed to be a 
presumption in favor of the primary caregiver, the court did not believe that the 
legislature intended to create such a presumption, and therefore it would 
decline to interpret it as such.100 Most subsequent appellate decisions in 
Washington follow the usual pattern of favoring custody by the primary 
caregiver,101 but a number of decisions uphold custody awards to the 
nonprimary caregiver on close facts that do not suggest that continued custody 
by the primary caregiver would be detrimental to the child or that the 
nonprimary caregiver is clearly a superior parent.102 In one case, the court of 
appeals acknowledged that the trial court could have decided the case either 
way and the appellate court would have upheld it.103 In 2007, the Washington 
legislature amended the law to require that the greatest weight be put on “[t]he 
relative strength, nature, and stability of the child’s relationship with each 
parent,” without reference to the past performance of parenting functions.104 
Given that the courts had not previously implemented the statutory language 
giving “greatest weight” to the performance of past parenting functions, the 
change appears to have little significance. Washington courts, like courts in 
other states, continue to tend to place greatest emphasis on past caretaking,105 
but not reliably so.106 
Taken as a whole, the statutes and cases recognize that past caretaking is 
highly relevant to a child’s best interests. At the same time, this law allows 
 
 99.  Id. at 632. 
 100.  Id. at 635. 
 101.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Littlefield, 940 P.2d 1362, 1372 (Wash. 1997) (en banc); In re 
Marriage of Carmichael, No. 22597-6-III, 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 251, at *5–6 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 
10, 2005); In re Marriage of Evans, No. 50544-1-I, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS 2095, at *10–12 (Wash. Ct. 
App. Sept. 22, 2003) (per curiam); In re Parentage of J.K.N., No. 46722-1-I, 2001 Wash. App. LEXIS 
2408 (Wash. Ct. App. July 30, 2001); In re Parentage of B.B., No. 18165-1-III, 2000 Wash. App. LEXIS 
812, at *8, *12 (Wash. Ct. App. May 30, 2000). 
 102.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Sullivan, No. 25117-5-II, 2001 Wash. App. LEXIS 3396 (Wash. Ct. 
App. Aug. 17, 2001) (upholding custody award to non-primary-caretaker father because, although both 
parents had used marijuana and the father had been convicted for manufacturing it, the father said he 
would stop and the mother did not); In re Marriage of Mazzi, No. 41998-6-I, 1998 Wash. App. LEXIS 
2483 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 1998) (upholding award to father because although mother was the 
primary caretaker, she was too enmeshed with her family and had personality traits making her less 
likely to facilitate a good relationship between the child and his father). 
 103.  In re Marriage of Carmichael, No. 22597-6-III, 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 251, at *3–5 (Wash. 
Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2005). 
 104.  WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.187(3)(a) (2005 & Supp. 2013). 
 105.  See, e.g., In re Parentage of Harker, No. 39899-1-II, 2010 Wash. App. LEXIS 2466, at *28 
(Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2010) (reversing trial court’s award of custody to non-primary-caregiver father 
because the court believed he had “the ability to perform parenting functions” and could better make 
sure that the child is aware of his cultural heritage as Native American). 
 106.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Harrison, No. 30011-1-III, 2012 Wash. App. LEXIS 2720, at *16 
(Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2012) (upholding award of custody to mother rather than father, who had 
been the primary parent, on the grounds that there was some evidence that the mother’s relationship 
with the child was stronger). 
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judges broad discretion to decide that something else is more important in a 
particular case. In the next subpart I examine the law in jurisdictions that have 
established a more reliable priority on past caretaking. 
B. Jurisdictions Giving Priority to Past Caretaking 
Only one jurisdiction in the United States—West Virginia107—has enacted 
the ALI Principles in full, including the past-caretaking standard. Since West 
Virginia adopted the ALI Principles in 2000, only three custody disputes 
between parents applying the approximation standard have reached the state 
supreme court. Each of these cases applied the concrete criteria of the statue in 
a relatively straightforward, predictable manner, including the statute’s 
exceptions. One case, for example, applied the “manifest harm” exception to 
the approximation rule, after finding that the mother lived with a boyfriend who 
had a criminal record for deviant sexual behaviors.108 The only reported cases in 
which the primary caretaker did not prevail concerned physical or sexual abuse 
by, or the unfitness of, that parent.109 
Although no other state has gone as far as West Virginia in prioritizing past 
caretaking as a statutory factor, courts in a handful of other states have 
interpreted their custody statutes consistently to include this priority. In South 
Carolina, for example, the state supreme court in 2004 stated “an assumption 
that custody will be awarded to the primary caretaker.”110 Since then, there have 
been only a few reported cases reviewing custody decisions between parents, 
and none of these have upset this assumption. 
In 1999, Oregon amended its law to require courts to give a “preference” to 
the “primary caregiver of the child.”111 Although the statute also provides that 
the “best interests and welfare of the child” shall not be determined by 
“isolating” any single factor,112 the preference has been applied by courts with 
some consistency to favor the primary caregiver.113 Since the effective date of 
 
 107.  W. VA. CODE § 48-9-206(a) (2009). 
 108.  B.M.J. v. J.D.J., 575 S.E.2d 272, 277 (W. Va. 2002) (per curiam). The harm standard is in 
section 2.08(1)(h). See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.08(1)(h) (2002) (providing an exception to the past-caretaking rule “to avoid 
substantial and almost certain harm to the child”). In addition, the court is obligated to fashion orders 
that protect the child from abuse. See id. § 2.11. The other cases concerned relocation and sibling 
visitation. See Storrie v. Simmons, 693 S.E.2d 70 (W. Va. 2010) (per curiam) (reversing the denial of a 
relocation petition by a parent who had been exercising a substantial majority of caretaking 
responsibility, and affirming such a denial when the parent seeking to relocate had not been exercising 
a substantial majority of caretaking responsibility); Lindsie D.L. v. Richard W.S., 591 S.E.2d 308 (W. 
Va. 2003) (sibling visitation). 
 109.  See Sanders, supra note 34, at 33 n.240 (citing John P.W. ex rel. Adam W. v. Dawn D.O., 591 
S.E.2d 260 (W. Va. 2003); Hager v. Hager, 591 S.E.2d 177 (W. Va. 2003); In re Frances J.A.S, 584 
S.E.2d 492 (W. Va. 2003)). 
 110.  Patel v. Patel 599 S.E.2d 114, 120 (S.C. 2004). 
 111.  1999 Or. Laws 1883 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137(1)(e) (2011)). 
 112.  OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137(2) (2011). 
 113.  See, e.g., Nice v. Townley, 274 P.3d 227, 229 (Or. Ct. App. 2012) (reversing modification of 
custody from father to mother on grounds that Oregon law has preference for primary caregiver and 
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the Oregon statute, there have been no reported state supreme court cases that 
have relied on subjective factors or speculative predictions in the allocation of 
parenting time, and the cases decided at the intermediate-appeals level display 
extraordinary restraint with respect to the statute’s stated priority. The few 
cases awarding custody to the parent who was not the primary caregiver involve 
circumstances that would likely have been sufficient to rebut the ALI priority 
on continuing past caretaking patterns. Two cases, for example, involved 
particularly egregious, ongoing conduct by the primary caregiver to stir up 
trouble or to deny or interfere with access to the children by the other parent.114 
In the absence of such extenuating circumstances, when there is a clear primary 
caregiver parent who is fit, Oregon courts have predictably awarded primary 
custody to that parent.115 
Massachusetts provides another example of a more determinate approach. 
Since 1993, the Massachusetts statute has provided that “[i]n awarding custody 
to one of the parents, the court shall, to the extent possible, preserve the 
relationship between the child and the primary caretaker parent.”116 The court 
shall also “consider where and with whom the child has resided within the six 
months immediately preceding the proceedings . . . and whether one or both of 
the parents has established a personal and parental relationship with the child 
or has exercised parental responsibility . . . .”117 In interpreting this statute the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court in the Custody of Kali concluded, consistent with 
the ALI Principles, that a judge ordinarily should “allocate custody in 
proportion to the amount of time each parent previously spent providing 
care.”118 Although in the Kali decision itself the supreme court affirmed the trial 
court’s determination that neither parent was the primary caregiver, every 
subsequent reported appellate case concerning the allocation of custody 
between parents either resulted in affirmation of a custody award to the 
 
that the father had not shown that the mother had ceased to be the primary caregiver); see also 
Sjomeling v. Lasser, 285 P.3d 1116, 1126 (Or. Ct. App. 2012) (affirming an order allowing mother to 
relocate to Utah to accept a new job and be near extended family). 
 114.  See In re Marriage of Kirkpatrick, 273 P.3d 361, 362–63 (Or. Ct. App. 2012); In re D.T.J. S-B, 
238 P.3d 30, 40 (Or. Ct. App. 2010). The Principles provide an exception to the approximation standard 
in response to a parent’s persistent interference with the other parent’s access to the child. See 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.11(1)(d) 
(2002). Another, closer case concerned the less involved parent’s ability to handle the special health 
and education needs of the child, who had lived with that parent since the parties’ separation—needs 
the primary caretaker had not been able to meet. See In re Marriage of Morales, 159 P.3d 1183, 1190 
(Or. Ct. App. 2007); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.08(1)(d) (2002) (allowing for departure from approximation standard to take 
account of a gross disparity in the parents’ respective abilities to meet the child’s needs). 
 115.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Bradburry, 238 P.3d 431, 437–38 (Or. Ct. App. 2010); In re Travis, 
237 P.3d 868, 870–71 (Or. Ct. App. 2010); In re Marriage of Ringler, 188 P.3d 461, 466–67 (Or. Ct. App. 
2008); McBrayer v. Randolph, 83 P.3d 936, 941 (Or. Ct. App. 2004). 
 116.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C, § 10(a) (2011 & Supp. 2013). 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Custody of Kali, 792 N.E.2d 635, 641 (Mass. 2003). 
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primary caregiver119 or remand of the case for reconsideration in light of Kali,120 
or involved circumstances that likely would have triggereed an exception or 
limitation under the ALI Principles.121 
Michigan requires that clear and convincing evidence be shown by a parent 
seeking to change “the established custodial environment of a child.”122 This 
custodial factor functions much like the past-caretaking factor under the ALI 
approach. Under the Michigan statute, a custodial environment is established if 
“over an appreciable time the child naturally looks to the custodian in that 
environment for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental 
comfort.”123 Courts have applied this approach consistently to impose a higher 
burden on a parent in a custody case who is seeking an award that changes the 
child’s existing custodial arrangement. This higher standard applies not only in 
cases involving the modification of existing orders, but also to custody cases in 
which no order has yet been issued.124 
These examples demonstrate that it is possible to have a more objective 
standard that, with carefully drawn exceptions,125 more consistently relies on the 
factor courts usually rely on in custody cases—past caretaking. Of course, to 
achieve consistency, it is important to have a stable understanding of past 
caretaking. In the next subpart I consider this definitional issue. 
C. Defining Past Caretaking 
Although past caretaking is more determinate than other, more subjective 
factors like parenting abilities and the quality of the parent–child relationship, it 
is important to note that a court’s determination of past caretaking patterns can 
itself, without concrete criteria, undermine the potential consistency of the past-
caretaking approach. At the time the ALI Principles were drafted, there were 
numerous examples of decisions that applied a double standard to parents in 
 
 119.  See, e.g., Hunter v. Rose, 975 N.E.2d 857, 860, 865 (Mass. 2012); R.F. v. I.A., No. 10-P-911, 
2011 WL 3341117, at *3 (Mass. App. Ct. Aug. 4, 2011); K.S. v. S.P., No. 08-P-169, 2009 WL 723104, at 
*1, *3 (Mass. App. Ct. Mar. 20, 2009). 
 120.  See, e.g., Ballou v. Garcia, No. 10-P-1800, 2012 WL 592833, at *5 (Mass. App. Ct. Feb. 24, 
2012). 
 121.  See Custody of Zia, 736 N.E.2d 449 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (affirming custody award to father 
who had actively participated in the child’s care, instead of the primary-caretaker mother, in the face of 
multiple incidents of the mother’s interference with the father’s shared legal custody and parenting 
failures that included rarely doing anything with the child except watching television and picking up the 
child from the home of the grandparents in a vehicle without a car seat, driven by a relative who was 
drinking an alcoholic beverage). The ALI Principles require the court to take account of persistent 
interference with the other parent’s access to the child, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY 
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.11(1)(d), (2) (2002), and provide for an 
exception to the past-caretaking standard to prevent harm due to a gross disparity in the parents’ ability 
or availability to meet the child’s needs, id. § 2.08(1)(d). 
 122.  MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.27(1)(c) (2011). 
 123.  Id. Other factors include the “age of the child, the physical environment, and the inclination of 
the custodian and the child as to permanency of the relationship.” Id. 
 124.  See, e.g., Kessler v. Kessler, 811 N.W.2d 39 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam). 
 125.  See supra text accompanying notes 23–25. 
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determining who was the child’s primary caregiver. For example, when a 
mother fulfilled the traditional homemaker role, she was ordinarily assumed to 
be the primary caretaker, but when she worked outside the home, or had an 
extramarital affair, she might be viewed as having ignored her children.126 
Conversely, a father who exceeded expectations and performed more tasks than 
fathers ordinarily performed was often given extra credit as a caretaker.127 The 
ALI Principles alleviate potential bias based on gender and other factors by 
defining caretaking according to specific, historical criteria. Caretaking means 
having provided the day-to-day care of the child, including discrete, measurable 
tasks such as feeding, attending to bedtime and personal-hygiene routines, 
caring for the child when sick or injured, arranging for medical care, education, 
day care, and recreation, assigning and supervising chores, and meeting the 
child’s developmental needs for motor and language development, toilet 
training, self-confidence, and discipline.128 
A number of courts in recent years have given significance to the same 
factors as those set forth in the ALI Principles.129 As an indication that 
stereotypes die hard, however, some courts have continued to evaluate 
parenting roles against traditional expectations and thus to give fathers credit 
for performing functions that are taken for granted when it comes to mothers. 
 
 126.  See, e.g., Marriage of Estelle, 592 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (affirming a custody 
award to working father as opposed to working mother, emphasizing that the father often prepared the 
child’s breakfast and dinner and picked her up from the day-care center); Landsberger v. Landsberger, 
364 N.W.2d 918, 919–20 (N.D. 1985) (in affirming custody award to father, court was impressed by the 
fact that, although the mother was the children’s primary caretaker and knew more about the child, the 
father had babysat while the mother was a “strong-willed” “career mother” who believed that a “life 
limited to homemaking is not adequate to fulfill her needs”). 
 127.  See, e.g., Hoover v. Hoover, 764 A.2d 1192, 1194 (Vt. 2000) (father deemed to have a “slightly 
more active engagement in the children’s lives” even though he spent only about nine waking hours per 
week with the children, as compared with twenty hours by the mother); Patricia Ann S. v. James Daniel 
S., 435 S.E.2d 6, 16 (W. Va. 1993) (Workman, C.J., dissenting) (per curiam) (pointing out that the court 
had been “bowled over by the fact that the father helped in the evenings and the weekends,” and had 
thereby elevated the father to the same caretaker status as the mother, even though the father had 
limited contact with the child but the mother had given up her career to be a full-time, stay-at-home 
mother); see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.12 Reporter’s Notes to Cmt. c 
(2002) (citing other cases). For an analysis of gender bias under the best-interests standard, see Susan 
Beth Jacobs, Comment, The Hidden Gender Bias Beyond “the Best Interest of the Child” Standard in 
Custody Decisions, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 845 (1997). 
 128.  PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 
2.03(5) (2002). 
 129.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Arnold, No. 9-057 / 08-1103, 2009 Iowa App. LEXIS 213, at *3 
(Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (factoring in that mother did cooking, cleaning, and caring for the children, 
including calling them from work to get them up and ready to go to school, even though father was at 
home with them in the mornings); Sitts v. Sitts, 902 N.Y.S.2d 274, 275 (App. Div. 2010) (identifying 
preparation of the family’s meals, bathing the children, making the necessary arrangements for day 
care, administering the children’s medications, reading to the children and putting them to bed as the 
relevant factors in determining who was the children’s primary caretaker); Nice v. Townley, 274 P.3d 
227, 230 (Or. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that the primary caregiver is the party who has provided more 
care for the child and who “has nurtured the child and has taken care of the child’s basic needs, for 
example by feeding the child, nursing the child when he or she is sick, scheduling daycare and doctor’s 
appointments, and spending time disciplining, counseling, and interacting with the child”). 
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For example, a South Dakota case declined to give weight to the mother’s 
indisputable primary-caretaking role because the children “often joined their 
father for farm work and while he was trucking” and “also enjoyed spending 
time with their paternal grandparents.”130 Likewise, a Tennessee court declined 
to favor either parent as the primary caregiver because even though the mother 
had been the primary caregiver, the father provided “a great deal of hands on 
care” for the child early in life and was more financially stable than the 
mother.131 
Sometimes the judgments about who has cared for the child appear to be 
infected by disapproval of one parent’s conduct. In one Vermont case, for 
example, the father admitted that the mother was “the larger caretaker,” and 
yet the trial court concluded that the parental roles were “substantial—possibly 
equal” on the basis of the father’s role in the child’s life had been increasing. 
Evidence of this increasing care was limited to the fact that the “mother had left 
the minor with [the] father for four or five days . . . when she went to New 
Mexico to meet the man with whom she had become acquainted on the 
Internet, and for another full week . . . when she went to Maine to meet the 
same man.”132 Similarly, a court in Nebraska considered the father the current 
primary caretaker, even though he worked ten to twelve hours per day, six to 
seven days a week, because the mother, who had been the primary caretaker, 
had begun going out with friends and staying out into the late-evening or early-
morning hours.133 
These cases show that even if legislatures give more weight to past 
caretaking in custody cases, the desired predictability will not be achieved 
unless the criteria determining past caretaking roles are also applied objectively 
and without gender bias.134 
 
 130.  Walker v. Walker, 720 N.W.2d 67, 73–74 (S.D. 2006). 
 131.  Strickland v. Strickland, No. M2012-00603-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 6697296, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. Dec. 21, 2012). 
 132.  Porcaro v. Drop, 816 A.2d 1280, 1284 (Vt. 2002); see also Gianvito v. Gianvito , 975 A.2d 1164, 
1170 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (affirming modification of custody in favor of the father after the mother 
proposed to relocate within the state because, although the child lived primarily with the mother, the 
trial court had a sufficient basis for deciding that the father was the primary caretaker based on “the 
quality of time spent by [the father] with [the child] and his impressive shouldering of parental 
responsibility,” and his “willingness to prioritize [the child’s] needs at all points”). 
 133.  Williams v. Williams, No. A-07-1103, 2008 WL 5064933, at *2 (Neb. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2008). 
 134.  In both West Virginia and Minnesota, the difficulties with the implementation of the primary-
caretaker presumption included gender bias and the proliferation of exceptions in determining who was 
the primary caretaker. See Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond the Best Interests of the Child: Re-
examining Child Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota’s Four Year Experiment With the 
Primary Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L. REV. 427, 460–79 (1990); Paul L. Smith, The Primary 
Caretaker Presumption: Have We Been Presuming Too Much?, 75 IND. L.J. 731, 740–41 (2000). The 
experience of Washington with its statute requiring that courts give greatest weight to past caretaking 
also illustrates how courts can apply determinate statutes indeterminately. See supra text accompanying 
notes 99–106. 
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III 
RELOCATION 
An especially difficult subset of custody cases involves the challenging 
situation in which the parent who has had the majority of parenting time with 
the child seeks to relocate. In recent decades, the law has swung back and forth 
between different approaches, even within the same state,135 reflecting the high 
degree of dissatisfaction and ambivalence associated with each approach. 
Some states address relocation under their general modification provisions 
which, traditionally, place the burden on the party seeking to alter a custody 
order to show “changed circumstances” necessitating a modification in order to 
serve the child’s best interests.136 A few jurisdictions that rely on their general 
modification standards to resolve relocation cases have inverted the proof 
burdens in relocation cases, treating the decision of where to live as a 
prerogative of the custodial parent and placing the burden of showing that the 
custodial parent’s relocation is contrary to the child’s interests on the parent 
resisting the relocation. Alaska courts, for example, interpret Alaska’s general 
modification statute to place the burden of proving that a proposed relocation is 
not in the best interests of the child on the noncustodial parent, as long as the 
custodial parent has a legitimate reason to relocate.137 In Kentucky, similarly, 
courts have interpreted the state’s general modification statutes to place the 
burden on the noncustodial parent to show that the custodial parent’s 
relocation will endanger the child and that the advantages of changing the 
custodial parent outweigh the harms.138 
In recognition of the particular challenges posed in the relocation context, 
the large majority of states today address relocation in specific statutes on the 
subject, rather than under their general modification statutes.139 In these 
statutes, too, the trend is toward a recognition that when a parent seeks to 
relocate, it is the relationship between the child and the parent who has 
provided the majority of the child’s care that warrants priority. Only Alabama 
applies an explicit presumption against the relocation of a parent with the 
child.140 A minority of other states place the burden of justifying the move on 
 
 135.  See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.17 Reporter’s Notes to Cmt. d (2002) (describing swings back and forth in the 
law in a number of states, including California, Florida, and New Jersey). 
 136.  See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 156.101 (West 2008 & Supp. 2012); McLaughlin v. 
McLaughlin, 647 N.W.2d 577 (Neb. 2002). 
 137.  See, e.g., Moeller-Prokosch v. Prokosch, 99 P.3d 531, 533 (Alaska 2004) (in relocation context). 
 138.  See, e.g., Fenwick v. Fenwick, 114 S.W.3d 767, 786 (Ky. 2003); see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 7501 
(West 2004) (setting forth custodial parent’s “right to change the residence of the child, subject to the 
power of the court to restrain a removal that would prejudice the rights or welfare of the child,” and 
affirming the decision of the court in In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 478 (Cal. 1996), which 
stated a “presumptive right of a custodial parent to change the residence of the minor children, so long 
as the removal would not be prejudicial to their rights or welfare”). 
 139.  See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-17-2.2-1 (2007); IOWA CODE § 598.21D (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 
23-3222 (Supp. 2012); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5337(h) (Supp. 2013). 
 140.  ALA. CODE § 30-3-169.4 (2011) (stating a “rebuttable presumption that a change of principal 
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the parent seeking to move, either by statue or by court decision.141 A few 
additional jurisdictions specify that neither party has a heavier burden than the 
other.142 The majority of jurisdictions, however, use some legal mechanism that 
enables a parent who has been exercising a clear majority of custodial care to 
relocate with the child, so long as the relocation is in good faith and for a 
reasonable purpose. In some cases, this burden takes the form of a “rebuttable 
presumption” that the intended relocation of a custodial parent with the child 
will be permitted.”143 In West Virginia, which tracks the ALI Principles, this 
 
residence of a child is not in the best interest of the child;” specifying that if the party seeking a change 
of principal residence meets the initial burden of proof on this issue, the burden of proof shifts to the 
nonrelocating party); cf. Rice v. Rice, 517 S.E.2d 220, 222, 226 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that in 
South Carolina “there is a presumption in child custody cases against removing children from the 
state,” but then finding that “any presumption” that existed was rebutted by the fact that the mother 
was the primary caretaker of the children and had moved in good faith to pursue better prospects in 
Maine, not to attempt to destroy the father’s relationship with the children). 
 141.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-408(F) (Supp. 2012) (if relocating out of state or 100 
miles away within the state, the parent seeking to relocate has the “burden of proving what is in the 
child’s best interests”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-56d (2009) (burden on relocating party to show that 
the relocation is for a legitimate purpose, is reasonable in light of such purpose, and in the best interests 
of the child); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 609(a) (2009 & Supp. 2013) (parent seeking relocation has 
burden of proving that relocation is in child’s best interests); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:355.10 (Supp. 
2013) (“[P]erson proposing relocation has the burden of proof that the proposed relocation is made in 
good faith and in the best interests of the child.”); MINN. STAT. § 518.175(3)(c) (2006 & Supp. 2013) 
(“burden of proof is upon the parent requesting to move the residence of the child to another state,” 
unless the person requesting the “move has been a victim of domestic abuse by the other parent”); MO. 
REV. STAT. § 452.377(9) (2003) (“The party seeking to relocate shall have the burden of proving that 
the proposed relocation is made in good faith and is in the best interest of the child.”); see also Elton v. 
Elton, No. A-12-180, 2012 Neb. App. LEXIS 203, at *20 (Neb. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2012) (same); Schmidt 
v. Bakke, 691 N.W.2d 239, 243 (N.D. 2005) (burden of proof in North Dakota is on the party seeking to 
move). 
Some courts have been clear that a burden of proof is not a presumption. See Bartosz v. Jones, 197 
P.3d 310, 317–19 (Idaho 2008) (affirming rule that moving party has the burden of proof, but noting 
that this does not amount to a presumption against relocation); B.K.M. v. J.A.M., 50 A.3d 168, 175 (Pa. 
Super Ct. July 31, 2012) (burden-of-proof statute does not create a presumption against relocation); see 
also In re Marriage of Thielges, 623 N.W.2d 232, 237 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000) (interpreting Iowa statute, 
IOWA CODE § 598.21D (2012), to contemplate changes in visitation schedule, not changes in custody). 
 142.  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-129(2)(c) (2012) (when the party with whom the child 
resides a majority of the time is intending to relocate with the child, the more rigorous standard 
regarding modification does not apply), applied in In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135 (Colo. 2005) 
(en banc) (interpreting the statute to hold that both parents equally shared the burden of 
demonstrating what was in the child’s best interests); FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(c)(1) (Supp. 2013) (“There 
is no presumption for or against the father or mother of the child or for or against any specific time-
sharing schedule when creating or modifying the parenting plan of the child.”); see also Tammaro v. 
O’Brien, 921 N.E.2d 127, 132 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010) (holding that if custodial parent has “good, sincere 
reasons” for a relocation, the court must then weigh all relevant factors to determine if the relocation is 
in the child’s best interests); Dupre v. Dupre, 857 A.2d 242, 260 (R.I. 2004) (emphasizing that both 
parents come to a relocation dispute “on an equal footing”). 
 143.  See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.520 (2005); WIS. STAT. § 767.481(3)(a)(2)(a) (2009) 
(“There is a rebuttable presumption that . . . continuing the child’s physical placement with the parent 
with whom the child resides for the greater period of time is in the best interest of the child,” which can 
be overcome if it is shown that the move is “unreasonable and not in the best interest of the child”); 
IND. CODE § 31-17-2.2-5 (2007) (once relocating parent shows that the proposed relocation is in good 
faith and for a legitimate reason, the burden shifts to the nonrelocating parent to show that the 
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presumption is particularly strong.144 Ohio requires the court to retain the 
residential parent from the prior decree, unless the parents agree otherwise, the 
child has already been integrated into the family of the person seeking to 
become the residential parent, or the harm of changing the environment is 
outweighed by the advantages.145 In Michigan, a parent who is the established 
custodian may relocate without the burden of showing that the move is in the 
child’s best interests, as long as there is the capacity to improve the quality of 
life of the child, the relocation is not inspired by a desire to deny parenting time 
to the other parent, and arrangements can be made to preserve and foster the 
relationship between the child and the other parent.146 In California, the 
custodial parent has the “right to change the residence of the child, subject to 
the power of the court to restrain a removal that would prejudice the rights or 
welfare of the child.”147 
Many relocation cases concern two involved parents. The priority on past 
caretaking cannot always be achieved in these cases. Under the ALI Principles, 
the strong presumption in favor of a requested relocation by the residential 
parent applies only when that parent has been exercising the “clear majority” of 
caretaking responsibility.148 When that threshold is not met, the Principles revert 
to the best-interests standard,149 reflecting the unavailability of alternative 
objective criteria that could satisfactorily resolve relocation cases when the 
 
proposed relocation is not in the best interests of the child); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461-A:12 (2012) 
(same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-108(d) (2012) (“The parent spending the greater amount of time with 
the child shall be permitted to relocated with the child unless the court finds” that the relocation “does 
not have a reasonable purpose” or “would pose a threat of specific and serious harm to the child that 
outweighs the threat of harm to the child of a change of custody,” or that the parent’s motive for 
relocating is “vindictive in that it is intended to defeat or deter visitation rights of the non-custodial 
parent”); see also Hollandsworth v. Knyzeski, 109 S.W.3d 653, 657 (Ark. 2003) (“We announce a 
presumption in favor of relocation for custodial parents with primary custody. The noncustodial parent 
should have the burden to rebut the relocation presumption.”). 
 144.  W. VA. CODE § 48-9-403(d)(1) (2012) (allowing a custodial parent who has been exercising a 
significant majority of custodial responsibility to relocate if that parent shows that the relocation is in 
good faith, for a legitimate purpose, and to a location that is reasonable in light of that purpose); Storrie 
v. Simmons, 693 S.E.2d 70, 73 (W. Va. 2010) (per curiam) (reversing a custody order in favor of the 
father and allowing the relocation of the mother who had exercised “the significant majority of 
custodial responsibility” over her children, and in companion case, affirming denial of relocation 
petition because relocating parent had not been exercising a substantial majority of custodial 
responsibility). 
 145.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.4(E)(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2013). 
 146.  MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.31(4) (2011); Gagnon v. Glowacki, 815 N.W.2d 141, 145–46 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2012). 
 147.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 7501(a) (West 2004). This statute was intended to reaffirm In re Marriage 
of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996), which put the burden of proof on the party opposing the 
relocation. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7501(b) (West 2004); Brown v. Yana, 127 P.3d 28 (Cal. 2006). 
 148.  What constitutes a “clear majority” is to be set by a rule of statewide application, but the 
Principles suggest that sixty percent would be a reasonable guideline. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.17 Cmt. d (2002) (suggesting that a 
percentage between sixty and seventy percent would be a reasonable rule of statewide application). 
 149.  PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 
2.17(4)(c) (2002). 
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parents are well matched in terms of caretaking and the practicalities of the 
situation do not allow for the equal division of custodial time. 
The statistics on the success of relocation petitions reflect the close reality of 
relocation cases. According to one study, custodial parents seeking to relocate 
are granted permission in forty-one percent of cases, and denied permission in 
forty-three percent of cases.150 In those states requiring consideration of a 
number of factors in determining whether a relocation is in a child’s best 
interests, past caretaking tends to be a very significant factor. When the parent 
seeking to relocate is the clear primary caretaker, appellate courts typically 
affirm orders permitting that caretaker to relocate with the child,151 or reverse 
court orders denying that permission.152 When a court denies a petition to 
relocate, it is generally either because the parents have shared physical custody 
more or less equally153 or because the parent’s justification for the move is 
 
 150.  See Theresa Glennon, Still Partners? Examining the Consequences of Post-dissolution 
Parenting, 41 FAM. L.Q. 105, 123–25 (2007). The other sixteen percent were remanded for further 
proceedings. Id. 
 151.  See, e.g., Veselsky v. Veselsky, 113 P.3d 629, 634–36 (Alaska 2005) (applying balancing test, the 
court affirmed permission for primary-caretaker mother to move from Alaska to Minnesota to pursue 
her education); In re Marriage of Guthrie, 915 N.E.2d 43, 46–48 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (over a strong 
dissent, affirming petition for mother, who was the primary caregiver, to relocate with the child to her 
home state of Arizona for job and family reasons); Kienzle v. Selensky, 740 N.W.2d 393, 396–98 (N.D. 
2007) (affirming grant of father’s motion to move with the children from North Dakota to North 
Carolina, when father was the primary caretaker and had shown that the move would improve his 
quality of life, including his job prospects, and the quality of life of the children); Valkoun v. Frizzle, 
973 A.2d 566, 569–73 (R.I. 2009) (affirming grant of mother’s motion to relocate with children from 
Rhode Island to North Carolina to live with her parents and enter a program to become a nurse’s aide 
on grounds that the children had been with her for virtually their entire lives and she had been more 
involved in their day-to-day life). 
 152.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Bhati & Singh, 920 N.E.2d 1147, 1159 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (reversing 
denial of mother’s petition to move from Illinois to North Carolina when the move would enhance the 
general quality of life for the custodial parent and the child, the mother’s motives were to remarry and 
to be able to care for the child as a stay-at-home parent, and a reasonable visitation schedule for the 
father could be established); Quainoo v. Morelon-Quainoo, 87 So. 3d 364, 370 (La. Ct. App. 2012) 
(finding it an abuse of discretion to deny relocation petition of custodial mother, who had accepted a 
promotion in another state); In re Hamilton-Waller & Waller, 123 P.3d 310, 323 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) 
(reversing and remanding trial court’s change of custody from mother to father after mother proposed 
to move from Oregon to Holland, stating that although no single relevant factor in determining the 
child’s bests interests is dispositive, the fact that the mother was the children’s primary caretaker and 
dealt with the children’s needs and difficulties on a day-to-day basis was a more significant factor than 
the trial court had afforded it); Durning v. Balent/Kurdilla, 19 A.3d 1125, 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) 
(reversing denial of mother’s relocation petition, despite her serious illness, because of mother’s 
historical role as caregiver and the potential dangers of disrupting established patterns); Dupre v. 
Dupre, 857 A.2d 242, 257 (R.I. 2004) (reversing custody modification in favor of father in the face of 
mother’s proposed relocation to Tahiti, the court stating that “[i]f one parent, in fact, exercises a 
significant majority of the parental duties and responsibilities, the child’s best interests undoubtedly will 
be closely intertwined with the well-being of that parent”). 
 153.  See, e.g., Mason v. Coleman, 850 N.E.2d 513, 518–19 (Mass. 2006) (citing PRINCIPLES OF THE 
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.17(1), (4)(c) (2002)) 
(affirming denial of mother’s request to relocate with the children where both parents had shared 
physical custody and thus court had to rely on other factors, such as the quality of the schools in the 
different locations). In the same jurisdiction, when the child lives primarily with one parent, that parent 
will be allowed to move with the child if the reasons are legitimate and the other parent does not prove 
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inadequate or is a pretext for interfering with the other parent’s relationship 
with the child.154 
Because the best-interests standard allows judges to give whatever weight 
they believe is warranted to the factors they consider, however, courts limited 
by only that standard sometimes deny relocation petitions by a parent who has 
been the clear primary parent. The judge might simply have the outlier view 
that being uprooted from the state is worse for a child than a loss of continuity 
in the child’s relationship to the parent who has performed most of the day-to-
day caretaking.155 Or the judge might believe that remaining near extended 
family members is especially important to the child—again, even if this means 
the child will no longer by raised by the parent who has been raising him,156 and 
 
that the move would be detrimental to the child. See, e.g., Abbott v. Virusso, 862 N.E.2d 52, 55 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 2007), aff’d, 881 N.E.2d 133 (Mass. 2008) (reversing trial court’s denial of the mother’s request 
to relocate from Massachusetts to Arizona, on the grounds that the trial court’s finding of detriment to 
the child failed to adequately take into account the quality of life of the custodial parent) (citing 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.17(1), 
(4)(c) (2002)). Likewise, case law in Vermont imposes a heavy burden on a parent resisting a relocation 
with the child by the custodial parent. See Lane v. Schenck, 614 A.2d 786, 790 (Vt. 1992) (holding that 
the noncustodial parent has the burden of proving that the child’s best interests would be so 
undermined by the relocation that a change in custody is necessary). However, Vermont uses the open-
ended best-interests standard when the parents share joint custody or when one parent’s caretaking 
role “approximated” that of the custodial parent. See Rogers v. Parrish, 923 A.2d 607, 611 (Vt. 2007) 
(past role of parent resisting relocation approximated that of custodial parent); Hoover v. Hoover, 764 
A.2d 1192 (Vt. 2000) (joint custody). Likewise in New Jersey, if a parent has custody, that parent may 
relocate as long as the move is in good faith and not “inimical” to the child’s interests. See Baures v. 
Lewis, 770 A.2d 214, 226 (N.J. 2001). If, on the other hand, the parents share custody, the burden of 
proving the child’s best interests is on the parent seeking to move. See O’Connor v. O’Connor, 793 
A.2d 810, 821–22 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002); cf. Allbright v. Allbright, 215 P.3d 472, 474–76 
(Idaho 2009) (affirming change of custody from mother to father based on mother’s intended move out 
of state, when mother had physical custody only slightly more than half of the time); Heinen v. Heinen, 
753 N.W.2d 891, 893–95 (S.D. 2008) (per curiam) (affirming change of custody to father when mother 
sought to relocate, when mother had been the primary caretaker, but only slightly more so than the 
father). 
 154.  See, e.g., Eniero v. Brekke, 192 P.3d 147, 149–54 (Alaska 2008) (affirming trial court’s decision 
that custody would be changed from the mother to the father if the mother moved from Alaska to 
Oregon, because although she would have better job opportunities there, part of her motivation was to 
limit the father’s ability to be involved in his daughter’s life); McLain v. McLain, 974 So. 2d 726, 729–31 
(La. Ct. App. 2007) (affirming order requiring primary-caretaker mother to return her two children 
from Tuscaloosa to New Orleans, from which she had fled in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, when 
the only reason to be in Alabama was a boyfriend and she had relocated without appropriate 
communication with the father); Graner v. Graner, 738 N.W.2d 9, 15–16 (N.D. 2007) (affirming denial 
of mother’s request to change children’s residence from North Dakota to Arizona on the grounds that 
although she was the primary caretaker of the two children at issue, mother did not have a job offer 
there, was no longer engaged to be married to someone from there, and could not prove any other 
advantages to the move); Hanson v. Hanson, 223 P.3d 456, 459 (Utah Ct. App. 2009) (affirming change 
of custody to father if mother refused to move back to Utah from Louisiana, even though she was the 
children’s primary caretaker, after trial court determined that the mother had used distance to frustrate 
the father’s access to the children). 
 155.  See, e.g., Maeda v. Maeda, 794 P.2d 268, 269–70 (Haw. Ct. App. 1990). But see Inoue v. Inoue, 
185 P.3d 834, 840, 853 (Haw. Ct. App. 2008) (stating that the trial court was incorrect to apply a clear 
presumption in favor of the parent who was not planning to leave Hawaii, although upholding custody 
to father on other grounds). 
 156.  See, e.g., Van Asten v. Costa, 874 So. 2d 1244, 1245 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (denying a 
2_BARTLETT_EIC (DO NOT DELETE) 7/18/2014  9:38 AM 
56 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 77:29 
even if the relocation would offer the benefits of proximity to the extended 
family of the more involved parent.157 In some cases, the circumstances so clearly 
favor continued custody with the custodial parent that it is evident that the 
court’s real objective is to dissuade the parent from moving altogether.158 If this 
goal is explicit enough, it is one of the rare grounds for reversal.159 
The past-caretaking factor draws attention to what makes many relocation 
cases so challenging—the importance of the continuity of both parents’ 
involvement with the child when that involvement has been extensive, and the 
difficulty of preserving that continuity when one party decides to relocate. In 
this context, a priority on past caretaking does not readily resolve relocation 
disputes. When one parent has been the clear primary caretaker, however, the 
elevation of past caretaking as a factor will reduce inappropriate reliance on a 
judge’s personal beliefs, in favor of a criterion that, by broad consensus, 
correlates strongly with a child’s best interests. 
IV 
DE FACTO PARENTHOOD 
Another troublesome issue in custody law concerns recognition of rights and 
responsibilities of a third party who has functioned as a child’s parent. The 
traditional rule, still often articulated in many statutes and cases, is that a third 
party may not obtain visitation or custody rights unless the child’s parents are 
unfit, unable to care for the child, or have otherwise relinquished custody.160 
Unfitness is a standard that typically comes with relatively concrete criteria 
developed in the context of parental-rights terminations161 and generally yields 
 
petition to relocate even though mother offered a compelling reason to relocate, because “substitute 
visitation would be inadequate to foster the same sort of continuing relationship between the former 
husband and the children that he enjoyed,” and “the children would lose contact with their paternal 
relatives”); Baxendale v. Raich, 878 N.E.2d 1252, 1258 (Ind. 2008) (in split decision, affirming the 
denial of a primary-caretaker mother’s request to relocate from Indiana to Minnesota for job reasons 
because, among other reasons, her eleven-year-old son had family members in Indiana). 
 157.  See, e.g., Elton v. Elton, No. A-12-180, 2012 Neb. App. LEXIS 203, at *18–20 (Neb. Ct. App. 
Oct. 23, 2012). 
 158.  See, e.g., Bartosz v. Jones, 197 P.3d 310 (Idaho 2008) (affirming change of custody to father if 
mother followed through with her plans to move to Hawaii, although mother was the primary 
caregiver). 
 159.  See, e.g., Allbright v. Allbright, 215 P.3d 472 (Idaho 2009) (reversing trial court’s order 
prohibiting mother from moving to Michigan); F.T. v. L.J., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 120, 136–37 (Ct. App. 
2011) (“To the extent the trial court denied Father’s move-away motion with the goal of maintaining 
the status quo and/or coercing Father to abandon his plan to move to Washington, it erred.”); see also 
Spahmer v. Gullette, 113 P.3d 158, 162 (Colo. 2005) (en banc) (holding that the court must make 
custody decisions as if the intended relocation were to occur and not order the parent wishing to 
relocate to live in a particular locale). 
 160.  See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.375(5)(5)(a) (2003 & Supp. 2013) (court may not award 
custody or visitation to a third party unless the court finds that “each parent is unfit, unsuitable, or 
unable to be a custodian or the welfare of the child requires”). 
 161.  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2269(b) (Supp. 2012) (parental rights–termination statute 
requiring consideration of (1) illnesses “of such duration or nature as to render the parent unable to 
care for the ongoing physical, mental and emotional needs of the child,” (2) “conduct toward a child of 
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predictable outcomes. Applied to situations in which a child has been raised by 
a third party in a long-term residential relationship, however, it can result in 
ending the most significant relationship in a child’s life, sometimes in favor of a 
parent who has not been at all involved. To deal with these difficult situations, 
many jurisdictions developed exceptions to the traditional rule to allow third-
party custody or visitation upon a showing that denial thereof would be 
detrimental or harmful to the child,162 or that other “extraordinary 
circumstances” exist.163 
Same sex–couple parenting arrangements, which became increasingly 
common beginning in the 1990s, were especially vulnerable to the law’s 
traditional resistance to recognition of third-party parents. In addition to the 
parental-unfitness rule, same-sex couples faced the law’s resistance to 
recognizing more than one mother and one father at a time.164 Through the end 
of the 1990s, most states that had considered coparent petitions for custody or 
visitation arising from these relationships had rejected them.165 
The first significant exception was a 1985 decision by the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court, In re Custody of H.S.H.-K.,166 which defined certain narrow 
circumstances in which a court could award visitation rights to a third-party, de 
facto parent, over the objection of the legal parent. These circumstances include 
 
a physically, emotionally or sexually cruel or abusive nature,” and (3) “the use of intoxicating liquors or 
narcotic or dangerous drugs of such duration or nature as to render the parent unable to care for the 
ongoing physical, mental or emotional needs of the child . . . .”). 
 162.  See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3041(a) (West 2004) (court must find that granting custody to a 
parent would be “detrimental” to the child before awarding custody to a person other than a parent); 
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 133 (2013) (court may award custody to person other than parent if custody 
to either parent “would result in substantial harm to the child”); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, 1653(2)(C) 
(2012 & Supp. 2013) (court may award parental rights and responsibilities to a third person if it finds 
that “awarding parental rights and responsibilities to either or both parents will place the child in 
jeopardy”). 
 163.  See, e.g., Watkins v. Nelson, 748 A.2d 558, 563–64 (N.J. 2000) (stating presumption in favor of 
parent over third party, absent a finding of parental “unfitness, abandonment, gross misconduct, or 
‘exceptional circumstances’”); Patzer v. Glaser, 396 N.W.2d 740, 743 (N.D. 1986) (holding that 
establishment of a psychological relationship by grandparents was not sufficient to establish 
“exceptional circumstances” or “serious detriment to the welfare of the child,” which is required in 
order to retain custody against the child’s biological mother); Cooper v. Merkel, 470 N.W.2d 253, 255–
56 (S.D. 1991) (per curiam) (holding that nonparent visitation was availably only with a clear showing 
of gross parental misconduct, unfitness, or other extraordinary circumstances affecting the welfare of 
the child); Bailes v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824, 827 (Va. 1986) (requiring “special facts and circumstances”). 
The classic “extraordinary circumstances” case is Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1976). 
 164.  For an analysis of parenthood as an exclusive status, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking 
Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear 
Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 879–83 (1984). 
 165.  See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Z., 724 A.2d 1035 (Conn. 1999); McGuffin v. Overton, 542 
N.W.2d 288 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam) (former same-sex partner of deceased biological 
mother lacks standing to obtain custody); Bodwell v. Brooks, 686 A.2d 1179 (N.H. 1996); Alison D. v. 
Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991) (per curiam) (de facto parents from same-sex relationship have 
no statutory rights to custody); White v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (denying 
third-party visitation after dissolution of long-term, same-sex relationship, absent statutory authority); 
Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682 (Vt. 1997) (denying third-party visitation to same-sex partner). 
 166.  In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995). 
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the consent of the legal parent to, and the fostering of, the coparent’s parent-
like relationship with the child, in the same household, and the assumption by 
the coparent of “significant responsibility” for the child’s care, education, 
development and support, “without expectation of financial compensation,” 
“for a length of time sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, 
dependent relationship parental in nature.”167 Importantly, H.S.H.-K. 
considered only a grant of visitation to the coparent, not custody. Even so 
limited, it remained an outlier for some time. 
Meanwhile, in contrast to the strict, parental-unfitness approach taken 
generally toward third parties seeking visitation or custody, a number of states 
began to carve out certain statutory categories of relatives, particularly 
grandparents, to whom courts might award visitation or custody rights without a 
showing of parental unfitness, harm to the child, or other extraordinary 
circumstances—even when the statutorily favored relatives were not de facto 
parents.168 In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court in Troxel v. Granville169 cut short 
this trend, disapproving an award of grandparent visitation objected to by a fit 
parent when that award was based solely on the court’s belief that contact with 
the grandparent would be in the child’s best interests. Although the decision 
produced no majority opinion, a plurality of the Court held that it violated the 
U.S. Constitution for courts to substitute their own judgments for those of the 
parent, whose decisions with respect to his or her child should be given “special 
weight.”170 Importantly, the Court’s plurality did not preclude the rights of third 
parties who had served in a de facto capacity with respect to the child; in fact, 
some members of the Court specifically identified the right of the child to 
preserve an “established familial or family-like bond[]” as a potential limitation 
on parental rights.171 Following Troxel, courts in a number of states invalidated 
their grandparent and other third party–visitation statutes or construed them as 
including a presumption in favor of a fit parent.172 
 
 167.  Id. at 435–36. 
 168.  See statutes cited in PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.18 Reporter’s Notes to Cmt. c (2002). 
 169.  530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 170.  Id. at 68–69. 
 171.  See id. at 85, 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (listing a “once-custodial caregiver” as example where 
it would be constitutionally permissible to award visitation, and identifying “a child’s liberty interests in 
preserving established familial or family-like bonds”); see also id. at 98, 101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(distinguishing parental rights against a “complete stranger” from rights vis-à-vis a parent or de facto 
parent). 
 172.  See, e.g., E.H.G. v. E.R.G., 73 So.3d 614 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010) (per curiam) (holding the 
statute unconstitutional, as applied by the trial court, for failure to make the requisite finding of harm), 
aff’d, 73 So. 3d 634 (Ala. 2011); In re B.J., 242 P.3d 1128, 1132 (Colo. 2010) (en banc) (reading Troxel 
and Colorado state precedents to constitutionally prohibit visitation rights to foster parents without 
rebutting the presumption that the father’s decision to deny visitation is in the child’s best interest); 
Fennelly v. Norton, 931 A.2d 269, 274–75 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007) (construing a statute allowing right of 
visitation to person with a parent-like relationship with the child to require, after Troxel, a showing by 
clear and convincing evidence that denial of visitation to third party “will cause real and significant 
harm to the child” (citing Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431 (Conn. 2002)); Richardson v. Richardson, 766 
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The treatment of third-party, de facto parents in the ALI Principles 
combines the approach taken by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in H.S.H.-K., 
allowing third-party claims to functional parents in certain limited 
circumstances, with the kind of limits on third-party visitation contemplated in 
Troxel. The ALI’s convergence on a unified concept of functional parenthood is 
consistent with its general reliance on past caretaking patterns. Under the 
Principles, courts may allocate parenting time to a de facto parent, defined by 
very specific and rigorous criteria.173 The Principles define a de facto parent as 
someone who has lived with the child for at least two years and performed at 
least as great a share of caretaking functions as that of any parent with whom 
the child also lived, with the agreement of a legal parent to form a parent–child 
relationship.174 Grandparents and other relatives receive no special priority, 
unless the child has no legal parent, de facto parent, or parent by estoppel who 
 
So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam) (holding that the grandparent-visitation best-interests standard is 
unconstitutional); Clark v. Wade, 544 S.E.2d 99, 100, 107 (Ga. 2001) (construing best-interests statute 
to permit custody to grandparents, with whom children had been living, if clear and convincing 
evidence showed that parental custody would cause physical or emotional harm to the child); Doe v. 
Doe, 172 P.3d 1067, 1079 (Haw. 2007) (construing the best-interests grandparent-visitation statute to 
require a showing that the denial of visitation would result in “significant harm to the child”); Rideout 
v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291, 298–99, 301 (Me. 2000) (construing grandparent-visitation statute to allow 
visitation if there was a “sufficient existing relationship” between grandparent and child and “urgent 
reasons” existed for the allowing continued access to the child); Koshko v. Haining, 921 A.2d 171, 191–
96 (Md. 2007) (holding that a grandparent-visitation order against the wishes of the parents is improper 
in the absence of clear and convincing evidence of compelling circumstances, such as significant harm 
to the child); Brandenburg v. LaBarre, 996 A.2d 939, 179–80 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (construing 
statute to require showing of exceptional circumstances in grandparent-visitation case after Troxel); 
Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d 1052 (Mass. 2002) (construing grandparent-visitation statute narrowly to 
further compelling state interest in protecting child, who had experienced family disruption, from 
harm); In re R.A. & J.M., 891 A.2d 564, 580 (N.H. 2005); Camburn v. Smith, 586 S.E.2d 565, 568 (S.C. 
2003) (grandparent-visitation order against the wishes of the parents is improper in the absence of clear 
and convincing evidence of compelling circumstances, such as significant harm to the child); Feist v. 
Lemieux-Feist, 793 N.W.2d 57, 59–62 (S.D. 2010) (avoiding finding grandparent-visitation statute 
unconstitutional by construing it to require showing of extraordinary circumstances); Stadter v. 
Siperko, 661 S.E.2d 494, 498 (Va. Ct. App. 2008) (construing best-interests visitation statute to require 
presumption in favor of fit parent after Troxel); In re Custody of E.A.T.W., 227 P.3d 1284, 1286 (Wash. 
2010) (en banc) (construing third party–custody statute to require not only that child is not in the 
physical custody of one parent or that neither parent is a suitable custodian, but also, after Troxel, that 
parent is unfit or that parental custody “would result in actual detriment to the child’s growth and 
development”); In re Custody of Shields, 136 P.3d 117, 126 (Wash. 2006) (en banc) (“[C]ourt can 
interfere only with a fit parent’s parenting decision to maintain custody of his or her child if the 
nonparent demonstrates that placement of the child with the fit parent will result in actual detriment to 
the child’s growth and development.”). 
 173.  PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 
2.03(1)(c) (2002). The ALI Principles also recognize a category of parents called parents by estoppel. A 
parent by estoppel is someone who lived with the child for at least two years, or since the child’s birth, 
during that time holding out and accepting the full and permanent responsibilities as a parent, either as 
the result of mistakenly thinking he was the child’s parent or as part of a prior coparenting agreement. 
Id. § 2.03(1)(b). Qualifying as a parent by estoppel entitles an individual to the same status as a legal 
parent, insofar as that individual has been treated as and assumed to be a parent, even by the legal 
parent. See id. §§ 2.04(1)(b), 2.18(1). 
 174.  Id. § 2.03(1)(c). 
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has been caring for the child and is willing to continue to do so.175 Importantly, 
being a de facto parent does not necessarily mean an award of parental rights or 
responsibilities. A fit parent will still have priority in terms of the majority of 
custodial responsibility unless that parent has not been performing a 
“reasonable share of parenting functions”176 or unless “the available alternatives 
would cause harm to the child.”177 A de facto parent, however, might outrank 
another third party, even a relative of the child, if a fit legal parent is 
unavailable, and might be allocated some parenting time (traditionally referred 
to as visitation) even if the legal parent is able to assume the majority of the 
child’s parenting responsibilities.178 
Robin Fretwell Wilson criticizes the ALI Principles with respect to de facto 
parents as offering a “thinned-out conception of parenthood.”179 Wilson states 
that of the twenty-five de facto parent cases decided between 1999 and 2010, 
only one case adopted the ALI Principles of de facto parenthood, and even 
then, only because the parties had stipulated to de facto parenthood.180 The 
remainder of the cases she studied, she states, “have rejected the ALI’s 
approach twice as often as they have accepted it.”181 Yet, by her own account, 
the “overwhelming use of the Principles by courts is as a ‘pile-on’ to support an 
outcome the court would have reached anyway under its own precedent or state 
law”182—hardly an indication of a rejection of the ALI Principles. Wilson cites 
cases that deny a party standing as de facto parent as evidence of the rejection 
of the ALI’s approach to de facto–parent status,183 and yet some of these cases 
explicitly apply the ALI’s criteria;184 the failure of a party to meet those criteria 
 
 175.  See id. § 2.18(2)(a). 
 176.  Id. § 2.18(1)(a)(i). Parenting functions, defined in section 2.03(6), include not only caretaking 
functions but also providing economic and other forms of support for the household. 
 177.  Id. § 2.18(1)(a)(ii). 
 178.  Id. § 2.18(1). 
 179.  Robin Fretwell Wilson, Trusting Mothers: A Critique of the American Law Institute’s 
Treatment of De Facto Parents, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1103, 1111 (2010). Wilson draws support for this 
proposition from a case involving an abusive live-in boyfriend who sought custody of the child when the 
child’s mother died, implying that the ALI Principles would have allowed such custody to be granted. 
In fact, the Principles incorporate measures to protect children and their parents from domestic 
violence and abuse—measures that are as strong as those in any existing state law. See PRINCIPLES OF 
THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.11(2)–(3) (2002) 
(requiring limits to protect the child from harm and placing burden on individual who has abused a 
child or inflicted domestic violence to prove that an allocation of custodial or decisionmaking 
responsibility will not endanger the child); see also B.M.G. v. J.D .J., 575 S.E.2d 272 (W. Va. 2002) (per 
curiam) (applying law of West Virginia—which adopted ALI Principles of custody and domestic 
violence—and affirming change of custody to father because mother could not protect child from abuse 
by mother’s boyfriend). 
 180.  Wilson, supra note 179, at 1144–45 (discussing C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146 (Me. 2004)). 
 181.  Wilson, supra note 179, at 1111. 
 182.  Id. at 1140. 
 183.  Id. at 1147-50. 
 184.  See, e.g., A.H. v. M.P., 857 N.E.2d 1061 (Mass. 2006) (applying standards set forth in the ALI 
Principles and determining that coparent did not assume sufficient share of caretaking functions); 
Smith v. Jones, 868 N.E.2d 629 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (holding that the mother had not ceded sufficient 
2_BARTLETT_EIC (DO NOT DELETE) 7/18/2014  9:38 AM 
No. 1 2014] PRIORITIZING PAST CARETAKING 61 
is hardly evidence that the criteria themselves were rejected. Cases that Wilson 
cites determining that the third party was entitled to visitation or other access to 
the child on other grounds,185 similarly, concern others points of law and do not, 
themselves, suggest a rejection of the ALI Principles.  
In only three cases Wilson studied did courts reject the concept of de facto 
parenthood, and these all involved the claims of lesbian co-parents.186 One of 
them was later overruled by subsequent statute.187 With respect to Wilson’s 
claim that the ALI approach represents a “thinned-out conception of 
parenthood,”188 it perhaps bears noting that most of the scholarly criticism of the 
ALI Principles has been that the Principles are too strict in the criteria they 
propose and in the limitations they place on the allocation of parenting rights to 
de facto parents, not too liberal.189 
Since the ALI began publishing Tentative Drafts of the Principles, the law 
in an increasing number of states has evolved in the direction that the Principles 
recommend. Various state courts, including courts in Massachusetts,190 New 
Jersey,191 Washington,192 Maine,193 Rhode Island,194 and Washington,195 have 
 
responsibilities to the coparent nor was their sufficient evidence of the parties’ intent that they share 
parenting responsibilities); see also In re Parentage of M.F., 170 P.3d 601 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) 
(holding that the stepfather did not meet the criteria of a de facto parent). 
 185.  See, e.g., Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 2006) (determining that the 
partner of the parent was a legal parent under Vermont law, and citing ALI Principles with approval). 
 186.  See Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d 1 (Del. 2009) (en banc); Janice M. v. Margaret K, 948 A.2d 73 
(Md. 2008); White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). 
 187.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201 (2009) (establishing de facto–parent status). 
 188.  See Wilson, supra note 179, at 1111. 
 189.  See, e.g., Laura Nicole Althouse, Three’s Company? How American Law Can Recognize a 
Third Party Social Parent in Same-Sex Headed Families, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 171, 188–91 
(2008) (criticizing ALI Principles for excluding most social parents in same-sex families); Susan Frelich 
Appleton, Parents By the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 30–31 (2008) (arguing that the ALI 
Principles do better by parents by estoppel, who are defined by factors that do not entail caretaking and 
are more likely to be men, than they do by de facto parents, who are defined by caretaking functions 
and are more likely to be women); Emily Buss, “Parental” Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 646 (2002) 
(defining as the “problem” with the ALI Principles not that they recognize third-party functional 
parents, but that in not giving these individuals sufficient authority, they encourage the fragmentation 
of parental authority); Nancy E. Dowd, Parentage at Birth: Birthfathers and Social Fatherhood, 14 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 909, 917 (2006) (stating that the ALI Principles do not address social fatherhood 
at birth); Mary Ann Mason & Nicole Zayac, Rethinking Stepparent Rights: Has the ALI Found a Better 
Definition?, 36 FAM. L.Q. 227, 249, 252 (2002) (arguing that the ALI’s “strict rules regarding the 
involvement and consent of the non-custodial parent . . . are a serious barrier, especially for 
stepfamilies” and “move[] only slightly away from the traditional legal paradigm”); Barbara Bennett 
Woodhouse, Horton Looks at the ALI Principles, 4 UTAH J.L. & FAM. STUD. 151 (2002) (arguing for a 
more flexible approach to de facto parenthood). For an argument that the ALI Principles are both too 
liberal and too strict, see Gregory A. Loken, The New “Extended Family”—”De Facto” Parenthood 
and Standing Under Chapter 2, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1045, 1063–64 (criticizing the Principles, on the one 
hand, for expanding potential number of claimants and, on the other hand, for sweeping away 
grandparent standing). 
 190.  See E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891, 897 (Mass. 1999) (citing PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW 
OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1)(b) (Tent. Draft No. 3 Part I 
1998)) (involving same-sex partner); see also A.H. v. M.P., 857 N.E.2d 1061 (Mass. 2006) (applying 
criteria for de facto parent but determining they were not met). 
 191.  See V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 551 (N.J. 2000). 
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recognized de facto parenthood under certain circumstances,196 as had a few 
state statutes even earlier.197 Since 2000, courts in Alaska,198 New Jersey,199 North 
Dakota,200 and South Carolina201 have recognized the similar concept of 
psychological parent. Pennsylvania and Arkansas have adopted the concept of 
in loco parentis in coparent situations.202 In New Mexico, the Uniform 
Parentage Act has been interpreted to permit a court to find that a coparent 
who has acted in loco parentis and in a custodial and parental capacity is a 
“natural parent,” entitled to all of the attending rights and responsibilities.203 In 
North Carolina, courts have developed the doctrine that custodial rights to a 
third party might appropriately follow if a parent engaged in “conduct 
inconsistent with her paramount parental status,” which includes bringing a 
coparent into the family unit and voluntarily allowing the coparent to act as a 
parent without creating an expectation that the relationship would be 
terminated.204  
Contemporary definitions of de facto parent typically depend, as do the ALI 
Principles, on, a prior, residential, caretaking relationship with the child, 
developed with the consent or acquiescence of the parent. For example, 
Washington defines a de facto parent as one who has developed a parent–child 
relationship with the consent of the parent, lived with the child in the same 
household, assumed the obligations of parenthood without expectation of 
 
 192.  See In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 683 (Wash. 2005) (en banc). 
 193.  See C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146, 1149 (Me. 2004). 
 194.  See Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 967–68 (R.I. 2000). 
 195.  See In re Parentage of A.F.J., 260 P.3d 889, 891 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). 
 196.  See also In re Parentage of A.B., 818 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), vacated and 
remanded on grounds not precluding recognition of de facto parenthood under the right circumstances, 
837 N.E.2d 965 (2005). 
 197.  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-123(1)(c) (2013) (effective 1989) (permitting “a person 
other than a parent who has had the physical care of a child for a period of one hundred eighty-two 
days or more” to file a petition seeking an allocation of parental responsibilities); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
13, § 733 (2009) (effective 1995) (permitting a stepparent with whom the child has most immediately 
lived to obtain custody if it is in the child’s best interests, even if there is a surviving natural parent). 
 198.  See Kinnard v. Kinnard, 43 P.3d 150, 151 (Alaska 2002) (affirming shared-custody award to 
father and stepmother, who was the child’s psychological parent); Buness v. Gillen, 781 P.2d 985, 987–
99 (Alaska 1989) (standing to seek custody is available to child’s “psychological parent” in the 
stepparent context). 
 199.  See V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000). 
 200.  See Edwards v. Edwards, 777 N.W.2d 606, 608–09 (N.D. 2010); McAllister v. McAllister, 779 
N.W.2d 652, 658–59 (N.D. 2010). 
 201.  See Marquez v. Caudill, 656 S.E.2d 737, 743 (S.C. 2008) (stepparent). 
 202.  See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5324(2) (Supp. 2013) (effective 2011); Bethany v. Jones, 378 S.W.3d 
731 (Ark. 2011); T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2001). 
 203.  See Chatterjee v. King, 280 P.3d 283 (N.M. 2012). This is the position urged by Nancy Polikoff 
in this issue of Law and Contemporary Problems. Nancy Polikoff, From Third Parties to Parents: The 
Case of Lesbian Couples and Their Children, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2014 at 196, 216. 
 204.  See, e.g., Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494, 550–51 (N.C. 2010); Price v. Howard, 484 S.E.2d 
528, 531 (N.C. 1997); Davis v. Swan, 697 S.E.2d 473 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010). For application of a similar 
approach in Ohio, see In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d 302 (Ohio 2011) (denying coparent status because 
mother did not agree to share custody with her partner). 
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financial compensation, and “has been in a parental role for a length of time 
sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship, 
parental in nature.”205 In Delaware, de facto–parent status is established if an 
individual has had “the support and consent of the child’s parent or parents who 
fostered the formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship,” has 
“exercised parenting responsibility for the child,” and has “acted in a parental 
role for a length of time sufficient to have established a bonded and dependent 
relationship with the child that is parental in nature.”206 Montana permits a 
“parenting plan proceeding” to be commenced by a person who has a “child–
parent relationship,” defined as a relationship 
in which a person provides or provided for the physical needs of a child by supplying 
food, shelter, and clothing and provides or provided the child with necessary care, 
education and discipline and which relationship continues or existed on a day-to-day 
basis through interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality that fulfill the 
child’s psychological needs for a parent as well as the child’s physical needs.
207
 
Similarly, in South Carolina, the third party must have lived with the child and 
developed a parent-like relationship with the child with the consent of a parent, 
for “a length of time sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, 
dependent relationship parental in nature,” and “assumed obligations of 
parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the child’s care, education 
and development,” including support, “without expectation of financial 
compensation.”208  
 Notably, some states allow standing for third parties on more expansive 
grounds but then limit the substantive right of these individuals, typically to 
those who had residential, caretaking responsibility for the child over a 
significant period. In Indiana, for example, a child-custody proceeding can be 
commenced by “a person other than a parent,”209 but to obtain any custodial 
rights as a de facto custodian, the child must have resided with the individual for 
at least six months if the child is less than three years of age at the time the 
proceeding is initiated, or one year if the child is older.210 In Alaska, a third 
party has standing to seek custody if he or she has “significant connection” with 
the child, but to get custody rights superior to those of biological parents, that 
individual must be a “psychological parent” and show clear and convincing 
evidence that custody to the biological parents would be detrimental to the 
child.211 Similarly, in Oregon, any person who has “established emotional ties 
 
 205.  In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 176–77 (Wash. 2005) (en banc); see also In re Parentage 
of J.A.B., 191 P.3d 71, 75–76 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (former live-in boyfriend was a de facto parent 
under Parentage of L.B. standards). 
 206.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (2009), applied in Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920 (Del. 2011) 
(en banc). 
 207.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-211(6) (2011), applied in Kulstad v. Maniaci, 220 P.3d 595 (Mont. 
2009). 
 208.  See Marquez v. Caudill, 656 S.E.2d 737 (S.C. 2008). 
 209.  IND. CODE § 31-17-2-3(2) (2007). 
 210.  Id. § 31-9-2-35.5. 
 211.  Evans v. McTaggart, 88 P.3d 1078, 1081–84 (Alaska 2004). 
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creating a child-parent relationship or an ongoing personal relationship with a 
child may” file an action,212 but to obtain custody or visitation, the person must 
show that he or she had been the child’s primary caretaker, or that 
circumstances detrimental to the child exist without such an order, or other 
specified circumstances.213 California’s standing rules are also broad, but before 
awarding custody to a third party, the court must find by clear and convincing 
evidence that parental custody would be detrimental to the child. Detriment, in 
turn, is specifically defined to include the 
harm of removal from a stable placement . . . with a person who has assumed, on a 
day-to-day basis, the role of his or her parent, fulfilling both the child’s physical needs 
and the child’s psychological needs for care and affection, and who has assumed that 
role for a substantial period of time.
214
 
More often, standing itself is limited to persons who have a residential, 
caregiving relationship with the child.215 Some states single out particular 
categories of individuals, like grandparents, stepparents, or siblings, as 
individuals who can seek specified visitation or custody rights,216 but since 
 
 212.  OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119(1) (2011). 
 213.  Id. § 109.119(4)(a), applied in In re O’Donnell-Lamont, 91 P.3d 721, 732 (Or. 2004) (affirming 
custody award to grandparents after death of mother, because parental presumption was rebutted by, 
among other things, evidence that the grandparents were the children’s primary caregivers in the 
months after the mother’s death and had had day-to-day contact much of the time before that). 
 214.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 3041(c) (West 2004), interpreted in H.S. v. N.S., 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 470 (Ct. 
App. 2009); see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 133 (2013) (providing that a “court shall award custody 
to another person with whom the child has been living in a wholesome and stable environment, or 
otherwise to any other person able to provide an adequate and stable environment,” if custody “to 
either parent would result in substantial harm to the child”). 
 215.  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-123(1)(b)–(c) (2012) (proceedings may be brought by a 
person other than a parent when that person has had the physical care of child for at least 182 days, or 
when child does not live with either parent), applied in In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 549 (Colo. App. 
2004) (holding that a psychological parent who has physical care of a child for six months or more has 
standing to seek the allocation of parental responsibilities); D.C. CODE § 16-831.02(a)(1)(B) (2001) 
(providing that a third party may file for custody if he or she has lived with the child “for at least 4 of 
the 6 months immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or motion for custody, or, if the child is 
under the age of 6 months, for at least half of the child’s life; and . . . [p]rimarily assumed the duties and 
obligations for which a parent is legally responsible, including providing the child with food, clothing, 
shelter, education, financial support, and other case to meet the child’s needs”).; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 25-5-29 (2004) (person who has served as the child’s “primary caretaker [and who] has closely bonded 
as a parental figure, or has otherwise formed a significant and substantial relationship” may petition for 
custody or visitation); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(a)(9) (West 2008 & Supp. 2013) (effective 
2011) (“a person, other than a foster parent, who has had actual care, control, and possession of the 
child for at least six months ending not more than 90 days preceding the dating of the filing of the 
petition” has standing); see also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-7-102(a) (2013) (a person who has been the 
primary caregiver for the child for not less than six months within the previous eighteen may bring a 
visitation action). 
 216.  See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-1(b.1) (2010 & Supp. 2013) (a “grandparent, great-
grandparent, aunt, uncle, great aunt, great uncle [or] sibling” may rebut parental presumption and 
obtain custody by a showing that an award of custody is in the best interests of the child); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 461-A:6(V) (2012) (the court shall order reasonable visitation to a stepparent or 
grandparent if it is in best interest of the child); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(D)(2) 
(LexisNexis 2013) (the court “may commit the child to a relative” if it is in the best interest of the child 
for neither parent to be designated the residential parent and legal custodian). 
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Troxel, these special standing statutes, too, often require that the relative has 
lived with the child,217 sometimes for a particular length of time,218 or can show 
that the child’s parents are unfit or unavailable.219 
Limits designed to preclude de facto–parent access when fit parents are still 
in the picture continue to exist in some jurisdictions,220 but are diminishing. At 
one time, for example, Kentucky did not allow a third party–custody or 
visitation petition if the child was in the physical custody of one of the parents, 
or if the child already had two fit parents.221 A change to the law in 2004 was 
interpreted by the state supreme court to allow standing to a coparent who had 
physical custody of the child along with the legal parent.222 Kentucky now, along 
with a few other jurisdictions, permits de facto parents to obtain custodial rights 
on the same terms as legal parents.223 
 
 217.  See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717(3) (2006 & Supp. 2013) (allowing standing for a 
grandparent with whom “the child is actually residing . . . in a stable relationship”). 
 218.  See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101(a)(2)(B) (2009) (grandparents who have been the 
child’s primary caregiver for one continuous year, or six months if the child is under one year old, shall 
be entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard in any child-custody case); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 
72 (McKinney 2010) (grandparent may apply for custody or visitation in case of “extraordinary 
circumstance” such as an “extended disruption of custody,” which is defined to include a “prolonged 
separation” from the parent of twenty-four continuous months in which the child “resided in the 
household” of a grandparent or grandparents). 
 219.  See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 601(b)(3)–(4) (2009 & Supp. 2013) (a stepparent who was 
married to the parent for at least five years can bring a custody action if the child is at least twelve years 
old, the custodial parent is deceased or disabled and cannot perform the duties of a parent, and the 
stepparent provided for the care, control, and welfare to the child prior to the initiation of the 
proceedings; grandparents, in certain specified circumstances, may also file a petition); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 722.26c(1)(b) (2011) (a third person who is “related to the child within the fifth degree” may 
bring a custody action if the custodial parent dies or is missing). 
 220.  See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 601(b)(2)–(4) (2009 & Supp. 2013) (a person other than a 
parent may commence a child-custody proceeding only when the child is not in the physical custody of 
one of his parents, unless the person is a stepparent or grandparent and satisfies specific provisions 
applicable those individuals); Scott v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 846–49 (Ct. App. 2009) 
(holding that a domestic partner has no rights when child already has two parents); Bancroft v. 
Jameson, 19 A.3d 730, 731, 736 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2010) (holding that statute recognizing de facto 
parenthood is unconstitutional when in conflict with the rights of two fit parents); In re Parentage of 
M.F., 228 P.3d 1270 (Wash. 2010) (en banc) (declining to apply de facto parent doctrine to stepparent 
when child has two fit parents). 
 221.  See B.F. v. T.D., 194 S.W.3d 310 (Ky. 2006) (holding that the domestic partner did not have 
standing to seek custody because the child was in the physical custody of the legal parent). 
 222.  See Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d 569 (Ky. 2010) (explaining that, since 2004, the law no 
longer precludes standing by a coparent to seek custody simply because the legal parent has physical 
custody). 
 223.  See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(1)(b) (West 2013) (“Once a court determines that a 
person meets the definition of de facto custodian, the court shall give the person the same standing in 
custody matters that is given to [the parent].”). The other jurisdictions include Indiana, IND. CODE §§ 
31-9-2-35.5, -17-2-8.5 (2007) (if individual by clear and convincing evidence meets criteria of de facto 
custodian, then custody is determined in accordance with the best interests of the child). The other 
jurisdictions include Arizona, Downs v. Scheffler, 80 P.3d 775 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (once nonparent 
meets in loco parentis standard, best-interests factors are used to make the custody determination), 
Colorado, In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 551 (Colo. App. 2004) (best-interests standard applies between 
mother and psychological parent, who was mother’s lesbian partner), Maine, C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 
A.2d 1146 (Me. 2004) (rights of de facto parent are determined under best-interests standard), and 
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Today, only three jurisdictions appear to remain committed to doctrines 
denying custodial responsibilities altogether to third parties who have engaged 
in day-to-day, residential caretaking in a parenting capacity, and the decisions 
expressing this commitment are lesbian-coparent cases, reflecting a special 
resistance to this particular family arrangement.224 Cases in two additional 
jurisdictions limit recognition of de facto parenthood to situations in which the 
de facto parent was married to, or in a valid domestic union with, the parent.225 
Otherwise, all jurisdictions who have directly confronted the matter recognize 
de facto parenthood in certain limited circumstances—circumstances that 
invariably relate to past caretaking. 
The emerging law with respect to de facto parenthood demonstrates the 
promising potential of highly detailed criteria focused on past caretaking 
history. These criteria have developed more recently, more rapidly, and in a 
context in which the potential conflict with parental prerogatives has required 
legislatures and courts to be more mindful of the necessity for concrete and 
objective criteria.226 For that objectivity, the law has come to rely on the one 
factor deemed important enough to children to override, in certain 
circumstances, the rights of their legal parents. The task remains of integrating 
the priority on past caretaking more fully into other aspects of custody law. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
There remains a widespread belief that trial judges are well situated to 
determine a child’s best interests on a case-by-case basis.227 Indeed, some view it 
as a strength that judges under a best-interests standard can rely on their 
instincts. One court defends the standard stating that “[o]ften trial judges who 
see the witnesses in a custody dispute come away with a gut feeling that one 
parent is a better fit than the other, though it may be difficult to explain the 
 
Washington, In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 174–77 (Wash. 2005) (recognizing common-law 
doctrine of de facto parent, which creates status equal to that of biological parent). See also HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 571-46(a)(2) (2007 & Supp. 2013) (giving de facto parent preference in custody disputes). The 
ALI Principles, as noted earlier, favor a child’s legal parents over the de facto parents in certain 
respects. See supra text accompanying notes 173–178.  
 224.  See Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73 (Md. 2008); White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2009); Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808 (Utah 2007) (overruling previous case and declining to adopt 
de facto–parent or psychological-parent doctrine to allow former domestic partner to seek visitation 
with child born during the parties’ relationship). 
 225.  See Harmon v. Davis, 800 N.W.2d 63 (Mich. 2011) (lesbian coparent has no custodial rights 
because only an individual married to the parent can be an equitable parent); Debra H. v. Janice R., 
930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010) (court may not grant visitation to same-sex partner who was a de facto 
parent, unless de facto status was based on valid marriage or civil union). 
 226.  On the relationship between evolving constitutional doctrine and these criteria, see Emily 
Buss, An Off-Label Use of Parental Rights? The Unanticipated Doctrinal Antidote for Professor 
Mnookin’s Diagnosis, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2014 at 1. 
 227.  See Dolan & Hynan, supra note 20; Warshak, supra note 35, at 99–100. 
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underlying reasons.”228 
In no other area do we turn such consequential decisions over to a group of 
individuals to decide based on their “gut.” That we do so in the area of child 
custody is particularly striking given the high level of emotional investment 
adults, including judges, can have in their own views about what makes a good 
parent and a healthy childhood. Nearly everyone has opinions on these subjects, 
often strongly held. In this article I have argued that the subjectivity of the best-
interests standard invites judges to apply their own personal views about what is 
best for children—as Robert Mnookin argued almost forty years ago—and that 
the past-caretaking priority recommended by the ALI supplies a reasonably 
determinate and child-centered corrective to this subjectivity. 
This priority is appropriate whether the parents have been jointly sharing 
caretaking responsibility or that responsibility has instead been unevenly 
divided. When other factors clearly outweigh the significance of those functions, 
various safety valves are available.229 The relocation context will continue to 
pose especially difficult challenges to child-custody decisionmaking because 
relocation often makes continuation of the approximate allocation of custodial 
responsibility impractical; when neither parent has been exercising a clear 
majority of caretaking functions, there might be no reasonably objective basis 
for deciding between them. Outside this context, however, past caretaking can 
help to satisfactorily resolve many custody disputes in ways that are predictable, 
consistent, good for children, and congruent with society’s commitment to 
family diversity. 
It is true that the application of a past-caretaking priority in any particular 
case might violate a particular decisionmaker’s (or observer’s) instincts about 
what is in a child’s best interests. There is no reason to assume, however, that 
the results reached through an intuition-based approach are consistently more 
sound. To the contrary, the inconsistency of such an approach suggests that 
some cases are sound and others are not. Past caretaking history is the factor 
with the strongest societal consensus about the best interests of children, and 
the factor that will also produce the greatest consistency. There is no good 
reason not to give it the priority it warrants. 
 
 228.  McKee v. Dicus, 785 N.W.2d 733, 738 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010). 
 229.  PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 
2.08(1), (4) (2002). 
